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Abstract
A complex System of Systems, integrating several hardware and software
components in the holistic perspective of providing an emergent behaviour
and operating within business-critical contexts, aims at affording contrasting
requirements of reliability and complexity in delivered functions and quality
of services by supporting system evolution and adaptation over time.
This dissertation contributes to the area of Model-Driven Engineering (MDE),
proposing a model-driven approach supporting timed failure logic analysis
of complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in business-critical scenarios.
The research defines a meta-model joining structural information about sys-
tem architectures with their failure logic, decoupling representations of com-
munication interfaces from those of failure propagation. The meta-model
also supports runtime evolution (which can be very fast in the case of com-
plex CPS) of concrete systems by enabling the configuration of product lines,
capable of representing multiple variation points of a component, support-
ing continuous adaptation of offered products and services to business or
customer needs.
The meta-model enables a round-trip engineering process through the
definition of a set of transformation rules, supporting the automated and
correct-by-construction initialisation of meta-model instances starting from
SysML Block Definition Diagrams for system specification and stochastic
Fault Trees for timed failure logic, thus activating co-evolution mechanisms
propagating external manual modifications, applied on meta-model instances,
directly to the adopted structural and reliability artefacts.
At the same time, a set of transformation rules has been defined so as
to enable the automated generation of Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPN)
from meta-model instances, thus supporting quantitative evaluation of the
timed failure logic.
The MDE approach is demonstrated on the case study of a CPS operating in
a Smart City environment, evaluating at design time different configurations
of the system with respect to the reliability of its cyber-side.
The research also addresses the design and the prototypical implementation
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Scientific, technical and technological advancement have promoted the adop-
tion of emerging paradigms (e.g., cloud computing, Internet of Things, In-
dustry 4.0) contributing in the design and realisation of complex System of
Systems (SoS), integrating several hardware and software components in the
holistic perspective of providing additional functionalities and of manifesting
an emergent behaviour, not natively resident in individual subsystems.
In this context, many Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [67] operating within
business-critical contexts (for which any critical malfunction or failure could
have a strong social, legal and economic impact) aim at affording contrasting
requirements of reliability and complexity in delivered functions and quality
of services, by supporting system evolution and adaptation over time.
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [18] helps designers, technicians, and non-
technical actors in the specification, design, integration, validation and oper-
ation of a system, reducing the gap between Systems Engineers and Reliabil-
ity Engineers through the adoption of models and meta-models (as partial or
simplified approximations of the concrete counter-part) conciliating design
abstractions with reliability artefacts.
Reliability models [57] (e.g., Reliability Block Diagrams, Component Fault
Trees) usually represent the failure logic of a system, capturing internal fail-
ure propagations only through provided communication interfaces (i.e., direct
couplings) directly interconnecting hardware components.
Complexity of emerging CPS is often handled on the cyber-side through
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the adoption of software communication middlewares (e.g., message-oriented
brokers) orchestrating data-level communications among components (i.e.,
indirect couplings), decoupling them from infrastructural interconnections,
also enabling dynamic adaption of roles and responsibilities for components.
Thus, failures occurring on the data-level are propagated through these in-
direct interfaces producing a kind of indirect failure propagation.
In this research, an executable software meta-model - a meta-model soft-
ware implementation producing runtime objects as executable instances and
methods - overcoming state-of-the-art reliability models limitations while
capturing the hierarchical composition of a SoS and its related failure logic,
considering salient characteristics of stochastically-timed failure propagation
mechanisms (along the system hierarchy through direct communication in-
terfaces or among distinct subsystems through indirect interconnections) is
presented. The meta-model also supports runtime evolution (which can be
very fast in the case of complex CPS) of concrete systems by enabling the con-
figuration of product lines, capable of representing multiple variation points
of a component, led by adaptations of offered products or services to business
and customer needs.
The meta-model acts as the core of a MDE approach, interpreting the shift
towards high-level and semi-formal models according to industrial contexts
and engineers’ mental attitude [87], for supporting reliability evaluations of
a system: the approach initialises the meta-model by exploiting industrial
artefacts of the common practice and provides a set of transformation rules
(to be applied on the meta-model) for producing in output a set of stochas-
tic timed models (i.e., Stochastic Time Petri Net) related to the modelled
systems. In so doing, the approach also enables subsequent quantitative anal-
ysis and simulation of the failure logic, through the adoption of pre-existent
software reliability tools (e.g., Möbius, Oris). The approach demands for a
semi-automated configuration process exploiting two artefacts:
• SysML Block Definition Diagrams (BDDs) for capturing the compo-
nents hierarchy of a system with a proper detail level describing direct
communication interfaces as well as redundancy levels;
• stochastic Fault Trees (FTs) for capturing error modes, to be intended
as internal processes of components (or subsystems) leading a set of
faults in manifesting a specific failure, as well as failure propagations
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among distinct components (or subsystems) which transforms a failure
manifested as an output of a source component in an input fault of
a destination component (in a direct or indirect relationship). The
adopted class of FTs enables a stochastic characterisation of underlying
failure processes.
Under the MDE perspective, the proposed meta-model guarantees: on the
one hand, a correct-by-construction configuration of structural information
about system compositions as well as their runtime verification; on the other
hand, an adaptive configuration of system failure logic, mapping reliability
artefacts (enhanced with stochastic features) to failure propagation mecha-
nisms.
Furthermore, the co-evolution [49] of the proposed meta-model with gen-
erated stochastic timed models (i.e., STPN), as well as with architectural
artefacts (i.e., BDDs) and reliability artefacts (i.e., FTs) is enabled by the
definition of dedicated transformation rules. In so doing, each modification of
the meta-model configuration can be automatically transferred into output
models.
The research has also addressed the design and the prototypical imple-
mentation of a Java-based Application Programming Interface (API) which
enables the programmatic definition of a meta-model executable instance,
retrieving information from input artefacts. This API can be considered as
the core of a tool (offered as-a-service) for configuring a meta-model instance
and for automatically deriving STPN models. In a general and functional
perspective, the output produced by the API can be integrated within a
Model-Based Dependability Analysis tool-chain, through the adoption of
other tools for analysis, risk assessment, dependability qualities evaluations,
safety parameters estimation, and formal verification of systems (e.g., Great-
SPN, Mercury, Möbius, Oris).
The MDE approach is demonstrated on a synthetic but realistic case study
related to a SoS operating in a business-critical context of a Smart City,
evaluating at design time different configurations of the system with respect
to the reliability of its cyber-side.
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 the litera-
ture review about primary Model-Driven Engineering reliability approaches
and models is presented together with a brief introduction about main fail-
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ure logic tools. A presentation of the proposed MDE approach for Timed
Failure Logic Analysis of business-critical and complex Systems is provided
in Chapter 3, also describing how Cyber-Physical Systems may be affected
by failures not propagating, conceptually, among components only through
direct communication interfaces. The designed meta-model at the core of
the MDE approach is presented in Chapter 4 including a description of the
round-trip engineering process leading the transformation rules from arte-
facts to meta-model instances, and vice versa. In Chapter 5 a description of
the transformation rules leading the generation of timed analysis models in
the formalism of Stochastic Time Petri Net, starting from meta-model in-
stances, is provided. A prototypical implementation of a tool implementing
key concepts of the MDE approach is presented in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7
a significant case study, showing the application of the MDE approach in
a business-critical context, with experimental results is reported. Finally,
conclusions and future research plans are drawn in Chapter 8.
1.1 Contributions
The research described in this dissertation proposes a model-driven approach
supporting timed failure logic analysis of complex Cyber-Physical Systems
in business-critical scenarios, thus contributing to the area of Model-Driven
Engineering (MDE) for reliability.
The main contributions are here summarised:
• a MDE approach bridging the gap between the perspectives of System
Engineering, Software Engineering and Reliability Engineering;
• the definition of a meta-model that decouples system architecture spec-
ification from failure logic, supporting also the modelling of product
families in a product line perspective (designed so as to cope with run-
time modifications, favouring reuse of created configurations);
• a set of rules of model-transformation implementing a process of round-
trip engineering from meta-model instances to adopted artefacts (i.e.,
SysML BDDs for components hierarchy specification and decorated
stochastic FT for failure logic modelling and stochastic parameters
specification) and back, so as to enable a forward engineering process
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automatically initialising the meta-model instance, guaranteeing con-
sistency by-construction, as well as a reverse engineering process en-
abling extraction of specification and modelling artefacts from a meta-
model instance;
• a further set of rules of model-transformation from a model instance
to STPN models for enabling quantitative evaluation of timed failure
logic;
• a co-evolution between the meta-model and output artefacts with the
primary advantage that modifications directly applied over executable
configurations of the meta-model automatically propagate to output
artefacts: SysML BDDs and FTs and STPN models, respectively ex-
ploiting transformation rules of timed failure logic and reverse round-
trip engineering ;
• an implementation of key components in a prototypical Java API, also
at the core of a tool-as-a-service, featuring the key steps of a tool-chain
that supports the MDE approach, opening the way to full automation.
In so doing, the API enable an export process of associated STPN
models, in a general format suitable in input to external analysis tools
(e.g., Oris);
• an experimentation on a realistic case in the application context of a




This Chapter gives a brief survey of related works about main
models and techniques for reliability evaluation of System of Sys-
tems and Cyber-Physical Systems adopting Model-Driven Engi-
neering (MDE) approaches.
The theory of MDE and major works addressing the problem of
co-evolution among systems and models are reported in Sect. 2.1.
Structural and behavioural models, failure propagation models and
(timed) analysis models are reviewed in Sect. 2.2. Primary tools
for reliability and failure logic analysis are presented in Sect. 2.3.
Finally, state-of-the-art MDE approaches for dependability are




In many design engineering approaches, the definition and the adoption of
models as partial or simplified abstractions of concrete under design hard-
ware and software components has become increasingly relevant. This con-
sideration is exacerbated in the design and development of Information Tech-
nology (IT) platforms and systems based on digital software components,
whose intrinsic behaviour and features strictly lay on intangible properties,
modelling a kind of approximation of physical reality.
Models help designers, technicians, and non-technical actors in the speci-
fication, design, integration, validation and operation of a system; also shar-
ing the evolution and scheduling of project activities and, at the same time,
in consolidating a common vision about operative domain, fundamental re-
quirements, superimposed constraints, and emerging functionalities.
A sufficiently broad and general categorisation of techniques and ap-
proaches based on models belongs to the Model-Based Engineering (MBE)
area, also known as Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE), in the spe-
cific case of complex systems or System of Systems (SoS) [31].
In this broad research area, many theories have been issued and multiple
definitions formulated: the survey in [24] and the work in [87] clarify and
discuss relations between different taxonomies, defining an ontology about
the concepts of system, model, meta-model, and modelling language.
First of all, Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [18,89] can be considered
as a high-level general purpose software engineering approach which uses
models as primary documentation artefacts, leading all the design, develop-
ment, and verification stages without mandatorily demanding for a concrete
tool support for the final implementation. Under this approach, design arte-
facts may also enable the automated or semi-automated derivation of further
analysable models (e.g., a mathematical model or a Stochastic Time Petri
Net), reflecting relevant and focused characteristics and behaviours coher-
ently with the operative domain context.
Model-Driven Development (MDD), can be considered as another high-
level approach which specialises MDE, focusing more on the adoption of
models and artefacts to realise a specific development process. MDD is
the common base in many Software Engineering methodologies, covering re-
quirements, analysis, design and implementation stages with support to au-
tomated code generation of complete programs from models, and automated
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verification of models (e.g., by executing reverse engineering processes). [91]
Model-Based Testing (MBT), can be considered as another specialisa-
tion of MDE, mainly oriented to automated testing through the definition
of testing models, capturing the behaviour of a system under test. MBT
approaches may depend on testing tools and frameworks. [4, 104]
Finally, Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) can also be considered as a
MDE specialisation, proposed by OMG (Object Management Group), sepa-
rating business and application logic from underlying platform technologies
at different levels of abstraction (i.e., Computational Independent Models,
Platform Independent Models, Platform Specific Models) so as to support
automated model transformations between lifecycle phases. [96, 114]
A connection established on Model-Driven approaches between the perspec-
tives of Software Engineering and Reliability Engineering may largely help
in accommodating the contrasting needs of complexity and reliability, by
making reliability models be structurally related to software design artefacts
and their evolution through model-to-model transformations.
2.1.1 Co-evolution of systems and models
Model-Driven Engineering approaches have to consider the continuous evolu-
tion of system models and meta-models, in their concrete and designed con-
figurations, as a major challenge for designers and developers. Indeed, dur-
ing software system lifecycle, the technological progress and the operational
domain may evolve imposing a change in requirements and system specifi-
cation, thus increasing the need for a strategy to address the co-evolution
problem, considering also the migration problem among existing models to
updated versions of related meta-models. In literature, the co-evolution of
systems/models/meta-models, also known as coupled evolution [50] or co-
adaptation [110], aims at supporting migration processes enhancing produc-
tivity and reducing errors through the adoption of domain-specific modelling
languages, frameworks and tools.
Many researches aiming at implementing tools for handling the co-evolution
problem are based on the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) [97], a col-
lection of Eclipse plug-ins which supports data modelling, persistence, and
automated code generation through the definition of meta-models. In EMF,
in a reflexive perspective, a model consists in a concrete instance of a meta-
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model which is built through Java annotations, UML, XMI or XML schemes.
In [23], a transformational approach is proposed for handling co-evolution
between meta-models and models, specifically addressing the representation
of software systems, by defining a higher-level meta-model capturing admis-
sible changes over the lower-level meta-model (e.g., the modification, the
deletion, or the addition of a class, an attribute, or a reference), thus lead-
ing the automated adaptation of the system model. The approach has been
supported by an EMF-based tool, named EMFMigrate [26] which relies on
a domain-specific language.
In [50], an integrated approach favouring reuse and expressiveness in
specifying coupled and transactional transformations of meta-models and
models is presented. The approach, named COPE, offers a set of primitives
based on EMF with the aim of reducing migration efforts, thus complying
with evolving syntax rules of different modelling language versions.
In [5, 99], the Henshin framework is described as a common foundation
for a wide range of tool by offering a transformation language to manage
models defined in the EMF [97] for supporting development processes while
providing also model checking and analysis capabilities.
In [43], a solution to the problem of co-evolution of a system architecture
with its quality models (e.g., Fault Trees) has been proposed by defining a set
of transformation rules, designed so as to support the continuous adaptation
and synchronisation of inter-related models, thus reducing the engagement of
developers expertise. The approach, supported by a tool named CoWolf [42],
has been experimented over a motivational scenario related to an automation
engineering domain [44], where authors demonstrated that fully automated
processes cannot resolve this specific co-evolution problem, which demands
in some measure for the human expertise.
In [65], an approach for defining co-evolution of meta-models and mod-
els defined with EMF is presented, demonstrated through static and runtime
consistency checks, and released as prototype tool based on Henshin. The ap-
proach is based on transformations and introspection rules applied over two
EMF graph abstractions in mutual dependence, respectively a meta-model
typed graph and a model instance graph: i) the meta-model graph includes
nodes representing primitive typed attributes, while the model graph in-
cludes nodes related to conceptual entities (e.g., a place or a transition) liv-
ing within the adopted model context (e.g., a Petri Net); ii) in both graphs,
edges represent relationships among interconnected nodes.
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2.2 MDE models
In industrial and engineering contexts, concrete development and runtime
maintenance of systems, especially for the case of embedded systems [68,69],
leverage the adoption of MDE approaches, continuously supporting domain
experts, technicians and engineers in structural and behavioural design. The
application of MDE techniques within complex SoS or CPS have not yet been
largely documented to be considered as a consolidated practice: a shift from
formal verification and fine-grained models (e.g., AADL) towards higher-level
models (e.g., UML-based models) is required. [87]
To these purposes, many useful abstractions and artefacts have been
introduced in the practice and in literature; also for modelling failure logic
characteristics of a system or for enabling analysis processes (e.g., descriptive,
predictive, prescriptive).
In this section, a review of significant abstractions is reported, with three
different perspectives:
• architectural and behavioural models;
• failure propagation models;
• timed analysis models.
2.2.1 Architectural and behavioural models
MBE approaches entail systematic adoption of artifacts and graphic con-
structs in the design and development of Information Technology (IT) sys-
tems. In this area, the default modelling standard, defined by OMG (Object
Management Group), is the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [17], which
provides a set of useful and extensible diagrams, classified in structural and
behavioural diagrams, respectively describing static structure (e.g., proto-
type) and dynamic behaviour (e.g., communications) of a system.
Structural diagrams notably include Class Diagrams (which model a set
of classes, entities, and interfaces with their designed relationships), Object
Diagrams (which model a set of static snapshots of object instances and
their runtime relationships), Composite Structure Diagrams (which model
the internal structure of multiple classes showing the interactions between
them, providing a logical view of a part of a software system) and Pack-
age Diagrams (which model dependencies among packages of a layered sys-
tem), Component Diagrams (which model the static implementation view
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of a system, representing components organisation and dependencies), and
Deployment Diagrams (which model a static configuration of a deployment
hardware/software system, with details with run-time processing nodes and
inner components).
Behavioural diagrams notably include Activity Diagrams (which model
the flow of control among objects, highlighting the dynamic view of a sys-
tem), Statechart Diagrams (which model state machines, consisting of states,
transitions, events, and activities), Use Case Diagrams (which model avail-
able use cases for each designed actor of the operative context), and the
isomorphic Collaboration and Sequence Diagrams (which model interactions
among objects, emphasising the time-order of messages).
A major characteristic of the UML notation is the extensibility of its syntax
and semantics, which guarantees the generation of ad hoc languages for spe-
cific application domains, overcoming limitations derived from the general
purpose nature of UML. In so doing, the main extension mechanism consists
in the definition of UML Profiles [37], grouping together a set of stereotypes,
tagged values, and constraints for customising diagrams elements.
Among these profiles, the state-of-the-art UML Profile for supporting the
specification, analysis, design, verification, and validation of a wide class of
hardware/software systems (e.g., Systems of Systems, Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems), is the UML 2 Dialect named Systems Modeling Language (SysML),
officially proposed and disciplined by OMG. [48] SysML includes diagrams
that can be used to specify system requirements, behaviour, structure and
parametric relationships, adopting as-is a subset of UML diagrams, modify-
ing others, as well as defining new diagrams in response to address require-
ments and parameters formalisation.
Specifically, while SysML reuses Package Diagrams, Sequence Diagrams,
Statechart Diagrams, and Use Case Diagrams, with slight or no syntax mod-
ifications, under a higher-level perspective about systems and subsystems
functionalities, SysML defines: i) Block Definition Diagrams (BDD), static
structural diagrams, extending the UML Class diagrams, with the purpose of
representing system components in the form of blocks decorated with prop-
erties and interfaces. A BDD describes the hierarchy of a system and depicts
system/components relationships; ii) Internal Block Diagrams (IBD), static
structural diagrams, extending the UML Composite Structure Diagram, with
the aim of modelling the internal structure of a BDD block, decomposing it
2.2 MDE models 15
in Parts, Properties, Connectors, Ports, and Interfaces. An IBD can be sum-
marised as a “white-box” perspective of an encapsulated block; iii) Paramet-
ric Diagrams (PAR), brand new structural diagrams which specialise IBDs
to represent constraints on system properties through parameterized blocks
(i.e., ConstraintBlock). A block models a constraint on a system parameter
value (e.g., performance, reliability) and can contain mathematical equations
or statistical values; iv) Activity Diagrams (ACT), behavioural diagrams
extending the homonymous UML diagram, exploiting control and object
data flows, to specify how the system dynamics satisfies functional require-
ments; v) Requirements Diagrams (REQ), brand new and static structural
diagrams, qualifying requirements, highlighting how model elements satisfy
them, and identifying which test case verify them.
In model-based analysis and specification of complex real-time embedded
systems, Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) [34], defined
by Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), represents a relevant industrial
standard in modelling safety-critical domains. AADL includes different ab-
stractions to represent application software components (i.e., thread, thread
groups, process, static data, and subprogram), execution hardware plat-
forms and resources (i.e., processor, memory, device, and bus), composite
components (e.g., aggregations of sub-components), and error models (e.g.,
for specifying faults and theirs behaviours). The specification enables de-
signers to express formal models about embedded systems with respect to
performance-critical properties through textual artefacts, eXtensible Markup
Language (XML) documents, graphical notation or through their combina-
tion. In so doing, information can be expressed interchangeably for con-
venience, with one or more alternative representations according to the ex-
pected usage (e.g., machine readable vs human readable formats). Among its
significant semantic characteristics, AADL includes the definition of elements
to express exchange and data control mechanisms (e.g., thread scheduling,
synchronised access to shared components, remote procedure calls), also in-
cluding operational modes and transitions to enable dynamic reconfiguration
of the runtime architecture.
The Modeling and Analysis of Real-Time and Embedded systems (MARTE)
is a standardized OMG UML Profile adding capabilities for model-driven de-
velopment of real-time and embedded systems. [40] MARTE includes, at the
same time, the definition of high-level system concepts about quantitative
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features (e.g., delay, duration or clock time) or qualitative features (e.g., or-
dering of events in time) and the modelling of low-level structural concepts
about hardware and software resources. Specifically, MARTE enables the de-
sign of AADL-driven systems, describing time properties, performance and
scheduling features, enabling MDE approaches to system design and devel-
opment. In this way, the designer would take benefit from verification and
validation tools and techniques dedicated to both the abstractions. [32]
2.2.2 Failure propagation models
Widely adopted formalisms in system reliability, enabling failure propagation
analysis are: i) Fault Trees (FT) and ii) Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD).
A standard FT, also known as static FT, is a graphical model which
represents failure modes cause-effect relationships within a system through
the definition of three types of nodes: events (e.g., basic, intermediate or
top events), logic gates (i.e., AND, OR, k-of-n, and INHIBIT gates) and
transfer symbols (i.e., transfer In or Out symbol). In so doing, FTs can
be exploited to implement qualitative analysis techniques (e.g., minimal cut
sets, minimal path sets, or common cause failures) so as to detect system
vulnerabilities, starting from an ordered visit of the FT structure, or quan-
titative analysis techniques so as to detect components critical issue levels
(e.g., through importance measures) or components failure probabilities (e.g.,
through probabilistic measures). [86]
A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a graphical and mathematical
model which decomposes a system into blocks of subsystems, specifying the
conditions necessary for correct functioning of the system within a success-
oriented flow logic. Similarly to FTs, RBDs enable quantitative analysis
and qualitative analysis aimed at determining system reliability or compo-
nent availability, as well as identifying (minimal) cut sets and importance
measures. [112] The RBD formalism enables both the definition of a higher-
order logic of common configurations (e.g., series, parallel, parallel-series and
series-parallel) and the formal verification of their equivalent mathematical
expressions. [1]
The subtended complementary nature of these two graphical models is high-
lighted and confirmed by the fact that, in most cases, an RBD can be con-
verted to a FT and vice versa by interpreting a parallel connection as an
AND gate and a series structure as an OR gate. [116]
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The demand for capturing sequence-dependent failures (i.e., sequential rela-
tionships among failures manifested on distinct components within a system)
leaded the extension of traditional formalisms with the introduction of their
respective dynamic versions.
On the one hand, Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) extend FTs by introduc-
ing new dynamic gates (i.e., Cold/Hot-Spare gate, Functional-Dependency
gate, Priority-AND gate, Sequence-Enforcing gate) [30, 51], also enabling
stochastic characterisation of basic events.
On the other hand, Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams (DRBD) have
been introduced to enhance traditional RBDs with innovative capabilities of
DFTs, by introducing the possibility of representing redundant units (i.e.,
parallel connection of its simple instances) and load sharing policies (i.e.,
two or more units share the same workload) [28,29].
A comparison between DFT and DRBD formalisms is reported in [27], also
defining a mapping of DFT to the DRDB domain as well as a feasible reverse
process.
Components Fault Trees (CFT), firstly proposed in [61], are directed acyclic
graphs describing failure flows directly derived from system ports/interfaces
among components in an architectural perspective. A FT, usually, is mod-
elled complying with the hierarchy of failure influences rather than the sys-
tem compositional hierarchy; in so doing, CFTs have been designed so as to
cope with modularisation of sub-trees and for overcoming the independence
assumption among events (e.g., a component failure may flow out to more
than one external component, generating repeated events).
Finally, the Failure Propagation and Transformation Notation (FPTN) [35,
36] is a formal notation for graphically specifying failure behaviour of a sys-
tem. FPTN is particularly suitable for modelling complex systems, enabling
designers to model composite structures through the concept of module, the
the atomic element related to a single component depicted as a box and
decorated with incoming and outgoing failure modes as well as its SIL level.
In so doing, the notation provide the ability of capturing the propagation of
failures along the system architecture.
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2.2.3 Timed Analysis models
Many MDE approaches adopt general purpose timed models so as to charac-
terise the temporal behaviour of a system, also in reference to dependability
analysis processes enabling continuous time failure propagation studies. The
practical adoption of these models requires a great effort to designers and
analysts, which must be experts, at the same time, about the operative do-
main and the underlying mathematical formalisms as well as about suitable
quantitative analysis techniques (e.g., numerical or simulated).
For overcoming this problem, many tools and methodologies (as respec-
tively described in Sect. 2.3 and in Sect. 2.4), leverage on higher-level ab-
stractions, describing systems architectures and failure propagations mecha-
nisms, so as to (semi-)automatically derive lower-level timed analysis models,
sharply separating the tasks of designers and analysts.
In the area of timed analysis model, Petri Nets (PNs) [81] are a signifi-
cant abstraction. While classical PNs constitute a powerful formalism to
model, to analyse, and to simulate behaviours of systems subject to discrete
events or discrete actions, several extensions had been proposed in literature
so as to address also continuous time events. A PN is a directed graph whose
primary elements are places and transitions among places. Tokens contained
in places move within the net in compliance with oriented edges directing
their flow. Usually, transition firings represent modelled system events, while
tokens and places represent the status of system in a custom/interpreted se-
mantics.
Timed Petri Nets (TPNs), also known as Timed Transitions Petri Nets
(TTPN), introduce the concept of time, classifying the nature of the model
basing on typology of adopted transitions:
• with only immediate (IMM) transitions (i.e., associated to a probability
density function of Dirac’s delta function with parameter t so that
t = 0), a TPN is equivalent to a classical PN;
• with only deterministic (DET) transitions (i.e., associated to a prob-
ability density function of Dirac’s delta function with parameter t so
that t ≥ 0 and t ∈ IR+), a TPN is named Deterministic Timed Petri
Net (DTPN) [45];
• with only stochastic exponential (EXP) transitions, a TPN is named
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Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [83] and it is isomorphic with a Continuous-
Time Markov Chain (CTMC), enabling the representation of negative
exponential distributions in IR+ for modelled events.
SPN formalisms have been extended in the Generalized Stochastic Petri Net
(GSPN) [2, 72] so as to include inibithor arcs, priorities among transitions,
and immediate transitions together with exponential transitions. In turn,
GSPN have been enhanced in Stochastic Time Petri Net (STPN) [108] so as
to cope also with general distributions on custom temporal supports equal to
or contained in IR+ (e.g., deterministic distributions, uniform distributions).
2.3 Reliability and failure logic Tools
Many lines of research addressing risk assessment, dependability qualities
evaluations, safety parameters estimation, and formal verification of systems
have prolifically contributed in the design and definition of tools for analysis
and evaluation of system reliability and failure propagation. In this Section,
a review of main research tools adopting fundamental modelling abstractions
is reported.
ADAPT (from AADL Architectural models to stochastic Petri nets through
model Transformation) [85] is a research tool for evaluating system depend-
ability measures (e.g., reliability and availability) starting from AADL mod-
els. The tool interfaces OSATE (see below), enabling automated transfor-
mations of AADL architectural models to GSPN models.
ASTRO [94], a dependability modelling tool which exploits RBDs, Stochas-
tic Petri Nets, and Continuous-Time Markov Chains; as input abstractions
so as to enable dependability evaluations and simulations from different per-
spectives (i.e., specialised or non-specialised users) experimented within the
specific context of data centers infrastructures.
CHESS [38, 75], a tool-set part of a framework for design, development,
and analysis of safety-critical component-based systems in embedded and
real-time contexts. Specifically, the tool-set defines a custom meta-language,
named CHESS-ML, defined as a collection-extension of standard OMG lan-
guages (i.e., UML, MARTE and SysML), exploited by two safety analysis
techniques: CHESS-FLA, performing Failure Logic Analysis through FI4FA
(Formalism for Incompletion, Inconsistency, Interference and Impermanence
Failures Analysis) [39], and CHESS-SBA, performing quantitative State-
Based Analysis for dependability.
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DEEM (DEpendability Evaluation of Multiple-phased systems) [14, 15]
is a tool enabling performance and dependability analyses for system which
must perform a series of sequentially ordered tasks for components subject
to a particularly stressing environments, which may change configuration
over time. DEEM adopts DSPN as the modelling abstraction and Markov
Regenerative Processes(MRGP) for numerical solutions.
GreatSPN (GRaphical Editor and Analyzer for Timed and Stochastic
Petri Nets) [3] is a long-lived tool for modelling, validation, and performance
evaluation of distributed systems based on Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
and Stochastic Well-formed Nets (i.e., a coloured extension of GSPN, defined
as a syntactic restriction of Stochastic High-Level Nets with the possibility
of exploiting Symbolic Reachability Graphs). Among its purposes, the tool
provides a framework to experiment with Markovian solvers (i.e., steady
state and transient performance evaluation) and interactive simulations.
Mercury [95] is a tool which provides an environment to model systems
through the adoption of different kind of formalisms (i.e., CTMC, RBD, En-
ergy Flow Models, and Stochastic Petri Nets). In particular, it includes ad
hoc graphical editors for each typology and a scripting language for program-
matic models construction and evaluation of dependability and performance.
Möbius [25] provides an integrated multi-formalism multi-solution ap-
proach exploiting Stochastic Activity Networks, Stochastic Petri Nets, and
Stochastic Process Algebras, as well as Fault Trees and RBDs, with differ-
ent analytical and numerical solvers through the use of a custom functional
interface, enabling interaction among models and solvers.
Oris [78], a toolbox for quantitative evaluation of concurrent models with
(non-)Markovian timers, including a fluent Java Application Programming
Interface and a Graphical User Interface for modelling Stochastic Time Petri
Nets. Oris provides several built-in engines for numerical solutions and simu-
lative methods for steady-state and transient analysis of underlying stochas-
tic processes.
OSATE (Open Source AADL Tool Environment) [33] offers an open
source workbench developed through eclipse so as to provide a graphical
editor, exploiting various models (e.g., AADL, RBD, Error Model Version
2), for modelling architectural and behavioural features of a system, pro-
viding also flow latency analysis, safety analysis (e.g., FMEA, FTA), and
automated verification of functional and non-functional system properties.
SHARPE (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance
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Evaluator) [103], a mature tool, adopted in the last decades by students,
practising engineers, and researchers, offering analysis solutions for stochas-
tic models of reliability, availability, performance, and performability through
the implementation of algorithms based on various models (e.g., Fault Trees,
RBDs, acyclic series-parallel graphs, acyclic and cyclic Markov and semi-
Markov models, Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets).
SMART [22] applies numerical solution and simulation techniques over
Petri Nets, discrete-time and continuous-time Markov chains (i.e., CTMC
and DTMC), through the adoption of statements written in the SMART
language (i.e., a strongly-typed computation-on-demand language), which
permits the programmatic definition of constituent elements of a model (e.g.,
transitions with a lambda rate).
TimeNET [118] is a graphical tool for modelling and executing performa-
bility evaluations on Stochastic Petri Nets and its coloured variants, support-
ing rare-event simulation algorithms for these models as well as transient and
steady state analyses over exponentially and non-exponentially distributed
firing times.
2.4 MDE for Dependability
The adoption of Model-Driven Engineering approaches to the area of de-
pendability analysis takes the name of Model-Based Dependability Analysis
(MBDA) [60]. Specifically, for handling the increasing system complexity
in several safety-critical or business-critical contexts1, MBDA aims at re-
ducing erroneous scenarios2 by (semi-)automatically synthesising, from un-
derlying design models, dependability information representing structural
characteristics3 and behavioural aspects4. As a logical consequence, also
the co-evolution of dependability models and meta-models (as described in
Sect. 2.1.1) becomes a key factor for designers and technicians in order to
guarantee safety, reliability, and maintainability of the assets under moni-
toring/analysis.
MBDA approaches primarily rely on two leading paradigms [92]:
1e.g., industrial plants, automotive, healthcare, energy
2e.g, system configurations where data inconsistencies or data incompleteness may
produce unexpected system behaviour
3e.g., the system hierarchical composition
4e.g., the system failure logic
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• Failure Logic Synthesis and Analysis (FLSA) consists in the analysis of
(semi-)automated generated system failure models (e.g., FTs, CFTs),
often exploiting hierarchical and component-driven abstractions de-
scribing the system topology;
• Behavioural Fault Simulation (BFS) consists in the application of for-
mal verification methods on system behavioural models (e.g., Finite
State Automata, Stochastic Petri Nets) adopting fault injection tech-
niques so as to simulate erroneous scenarios.
This dissertation addresses FLSA techniques, focusing on the Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) [106] family, exploiting different FT abstractions (e.g., Stan-
dard Fault Trees, Dynamic Fault Trees) so as to cope with different investiga-
tion intents. In general, while the analysis process can be easily automated,
the designing stage of the FT artefacts is usually handcrafted by domain
experts (e.g., a reliability engineer) after a stage of Failure Modes Effects
Analysis (FMEA) [16, 19] or Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) [20]. Nevertheless, several approaches have been proposed so as
to automatically derive FTs from structural or behavioural artefacts, as de-
scribed in [59, 70, 74], respectively adopting Finite State Automata, AADL
notations, and SysML IBDs. The survey in [11] synthesises and classifies
efforts done in this research topic specifically for UML-based models.
FTA can be performed on two distinct levels: i) on a qualitative level for
identifying minimal cut-sets or root-causes analysis by applying an ordered
visit along the structure of the FT; ii) on a quantitative level for detecting
components criticalities through the computation of importance measures
(e.g., Birnbaum) or stochastic characterisation of components failure prob-
abilities. A complete survey about main qualitative and quantitative FTA
algorithms is addressed in [86].
In [79], the Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation
Studies (HiP-HOPS) method is described, which executes FTA and FMEA
analyses on FTs, automatically generated by visiting handcrafted composi-
tional system models decorated with failure annotations. A technique based
on HiP-HOPS, exploiting a temporal extension of FTs, is presented in [111]
so as to enable analysis of systems where the order of occurred faults and
manifested events is fundamental to model the failure behaviour.
In [47], a MBDA approach based on CFTs is presented; starting from
system components identification, a FTPN module describing the internal
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failure logic is annotated for each component. FTPN modules lead a sub-
sequent automated derivation of CFTs, which in turn enable quantitative
analysis of the system-level failure by hierarchically composing CFTs to the
whole system.
The Open Modelling approach for Availability and Reliability of Sys-
tems (OpenMARS), an approach for risk assessment of complex industrial
systems, is proposed in [80]. OpenMARS exploits at the same time failure
logic models (e.g., FTs, RBDs) and behavioural abstractions (e.g., Markov
models, Petri Nets) also combining different analysis techniques (e.g. FTA,
Petri Net analysis).
A framework providing a Reliability Configuration Model (RCM) and a
Static Fault Tree Model (SFTM) so as to embed system configurations and
and error mechanism for enabling reliability analysis and automatic static
FT generation is described in [115].
In [90], a custom SysML diagram (i.e., FMEA) for supporting design and
documentation of FMEA information (e.g., faults, failure modes, propaga-
tion effects) for critical systems, thus enabling qualitative and quantitative
analyses stages, is proposed.
Finally, some works address the proposal of intermediate models bridging
the gap between high-level formalisms and quantitative models, in the same
research direction followed by this dissertation.
A MDE approach exploiting a model-transformation from design arte-
facts (e.g., UML-based) to quantitative analysis models (e.g., Queueing Net-
works, Petri Nets, Markov Processes) based on a intermediate meta-model
named KLAPER (Kernel LAnguage for PErformance and Reliability anal-
ysis) is described in [46]. This kernel language aims at reducing the gap
between design-oriented and analysis-oriented notations, supporting in the
generation of performance and reliability models from design models (in dif-
ferent notations).
In [76], a discussion about main dependability concerns to be considered
during dependability analysis is addressed with the aim of defining a concep-
tual model, proposing an intermediate dependability model between high-
level engineering languages (e.g., UML) and low-level dependability analysis
formalisms (e.g., GSPN), actually at the core of the CHESS tool.
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Chapter 3
The MDE approach for
business-critical Systems
In this Chapter, a reasoned overview about System of Systems
and their classification is addressed with the aim of contextualis-
ing the problem of failure propagation analysis with reference to
systems salient characteristics (i.e., structural and behavioural
aspects).
In particular, complex IT/OT systems operating within business-
critical contexts are described in Sect. 3.1, where fundamental
keywords (i.e., direct/indirect couplings, fault-to-failure, failure-
to-fault) are introduced and defined. Sect. 3.2 introduces the
Model-Drive Engineering approach, leveraging on the proposed
meta-model of Chapter 4 for reducing the gap between design arte-
facts (i.e., structural models and reliability models) and analysis
stages, where executable software models are adopted for enabling
quantitative reliability evaluations.
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3.1 Business-critical Systems
Scientific, technical and technological advancement, sustained by an increas-
ing qualification of personnel and a greater inclination for innovation, has
promoted the adoption of emerging paradigms (e.g., cloud computing, Inter-
net of Things, Industry 4.0) in multiple public authorities, enterprises, and
organisations operating in various fields (e.g., smart city, industrial manu-
facturing, environmental monitoring, smart healthcare, automotive).
In so doing, Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology
(OT) sectors are contributing in creating sophisticated software systems ca-
pable of satisfying companies needs, affording requirements of growing com-
plexity in delivered functions and quality of services by supporting system
evolution and adaptation over time. This concept is emphasised for software
intensive systems [58]; this broad class of systems supports business-critical
operations, for which any critical malfunction or failure could have a strong
social, legal and economic impact.
To better contextualise the problem of failure propagation analysis within
complex business-critical systems, it is necessary to briefly review salient fea-
tures of main system families of interest.
According to the widely adopted definition in [13]: “a system is a collection
of entities and their interrelationships gathered together to form a whole
greater than the sum of the parts”.
The above definition enlightens that a system must be considered as a hi-
erarchical aggregation of different interacting components, designed as an
ensemble so as to provide common and predefined functionalities.
The continuous evolution in terms of design and development with an
increasing integration among system entities led to the conceptualisation
of a new terminology which considers the case of distinct interconnected
systems, namely subsystems, often distributed on a large geographic scale
(as in the case of IT systems where modules may be deployed on the cloud
as well as at-the-edge of Internet), manifesting an emergent behaviour. [71]
Specifically, System of Systems (SoS) have been defined in [66]: “a system
of systems is a set of different systems so connected or related as to produce
results unachievable by the individual systems alone”. Under this perspec-
tive, a SoS can be seen as a complex entity equipped with high adaptability,
able to provide additional functionalities not natively resident in individual
subsystems, thus concretising an holistic vision which supports operational
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and managerial independence.
An inner classification of SoS, based on their characterising aspects in
terms of coordination, runtime behaviour, autonomy, and complexity, has
emerged from literature.
A SoS commanded and controlled under many authorities, with a limited
central power, is named Federation of Systems [88]. In this category, a SoS is
managed by a federated coalition of partners through an active collaboration
and coordination based on uniform agreements, standardised communication
protocols, and shared behaviours while guaranteeing separation of powers
and subsidiary interdependence.
Ultra-large-scale SoS highly adaptable at runtime in response to archi-
tectural, parametric, as well as functional changes, not expected at design-
time, are named Interwoven Systems [102]. In this category, subsystems
are characterised so as to face challenges in maintaining desired functional
performances by autonomously self-organising and self-optimising their own
behaviour, while achieving the overall system specification requirements re-
ducing conflicts which may occur during operational lifecycle, being aware
of existent mutual influences.
In general, systems must be considered as a hierarchy of entities (i.e., inner
components or distinct subsystems) interacting through dedicated hardware
and software communication interfaces complying with specific protocols and
exchange data-contracts. As a consequence, the number of communication
interfaces directly influences the complexity of system architectures, requir-
ing an increasing effort in design, conduct, and control operations, further
exacerbated within SoS and even more in Federations of Systems and Inter-
woven Systems.
Along interfaces the information, in its various kinds (e.g., data packets,
action commands, electric signals), is exchanged between system entities
contributing to the overall system control and functioning, thus generating
a kind of communication flow. In so doing, also incorrect information, which
may generate failure scenarios, converges through the same communication
flow crossing all the provided interfaces in the designed order.
In the perspective of distributed systems, as in the case of a SoS, the
communication flow follows two different modes:
1. intra-subsystem mode, when the information traverses local interfaces
interconnecting inner components within a single subsystem. In this
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case, the information mainly follows the physical and concrete structure
specification;
2. inter-subsystems mode, where information traverses interfaces inter-
connecting remote components belonging to different subsystems. In
this case, the information mainly respects functional requirements and
integration policies following the separation of concerns paradigm.
Note that, the communication flow intrinsically generates dependencies in
failure-to-fault couplings among interconnected components (or among dis-
tinct subsystems) in the sense that a failure manifested by a component
may be propagated through interfaces in dependent components, generating
a fault and thus entering in an error mode.
Logically, communication interfaces create low-level propagation cou-
plings in terms of overall system reliability (e.g., a power supply failure or a
Wi-Fi repeater failure may cause consequential faults in each interconnected
device by, respectively, turning off or disconnecting dependent components).
At the same time, also couplings at an higher level of abstraction may
be produced among components not directly interconnected by interfaces.
These couplings are conceptually bound to failures originated within ex-
changed information data/meta-data (e.g., header, payload), which are prop-
agated only to dependent components which should consume, interpret and
manipulate them. Indeed, the components which exclusively route these in-
formation along the communication flow are not aware about the presence of
errors, corruptions or missing data. These components cannot be considered
as in an error state, while components dependent on exchanged data may
become faulty.
The presence of couplings among components not directly interconnected
is exacerbated within the class of SoS, widespread in the industrial context,
named Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). CPS are characterised by a software
side that coordinates and controls components distributed across the over-
all system, assuming the responsibility of affording the functional and be-
havioural complexity. In this scenario, the cyber-side assumes a central role,
giving intelligence to the system in supporting operation and integration of
controlled assets, enforcing policies and governing enterprise components for
which resilience comprises a core requirement.
As a consequence, from the point of view of the overall SoS, failures propa-
gation is led by existing couplings among components of each subsystem. In
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this dissertation:
• low-level propagation couplings among components (or subsystems) in-
terconnected through intra-subsystem and inter-subsystems interfaces
are named direct couplings; these couplings comply with the structural
specification of the system;
• high-level propagation couplings among components (or subsystems)
not directly interconnected by interfaces are named indirect couplings;
these couplings comply with use case scenarios and business logic mod-
elled within the orchestration logic embedded into the software con-
trollers.
A SoS, to all effects, is much more than a container exploiting a collec-
tion of gathered subsystems acting as autonomous entities with different
aims so that the integration logic realises a masterplan to offer value-added
services, according to an Enterprise Application Integration vision. Indeed,
SoS adopting Enterprise Integration Patterns for modelling inter-connections
among subsystems, as in the case of Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), message-
oriented Internet of Things brokers, and micro-service architectures, are not
trivial to be managed by system designers, reliability engineers and mainte-
nance technicians.
In the specific case, reliability analyses should not focus only on the
study of fault-to-failure propagation within a single component but should
also stress failure-to-fault propagation among different subsystems, basing
on modelled direct and indirect couplings (see Fig. 3.1).




Figure 3.1: Figure enlightening the interpretation of fault-to-failure and
failure-to-fault concepts within the chain of threats [7] (aka fault-error-failure
chain), expressing a causality relationship between faults, errors, and failures.
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In particular, analysts should account for two different failure propagation
processes:
• an intra-component analysis to evaluate the fault-to-failure propaga-
tion, capturing how internal faults lead component to manifest failures;
• an inter-component analysis to evaluate failure-to-fault propagation,
capturing how an output failure of a component affects other compo-
nents acting as inner faults.
3.2 The MDE approach
The adoption of models and abstractions for the specification, the design,
the integration, and the validation stages is a key factor for the continuous
maintenance and operation of SoS. In so doing, Model-Driven Engineering
(MDE) may support designers, technicians, and non-technical actors in the
completion of these tasks, aiming also at reducing the negative impact of
failures within business-critical contexts.
Specifically, this dissertation presents a MDE approach for SoS, address-
ing direct and indirect couplings in failure propagation mechanisms among
components/subsystems, which reduces the gap between design artefacts
(i.e., structural models and dependability models) and analysis stages where
executable software models are adopted for enabling quantitative reliability
evaluations.
The approach leverages on an executable meta-model representation, de-
scribed in Chapter 4, capturing hierarchical composition of a SoS and re-
lated failure propagation mechanisms, considering salient characteristics of
stochastically-timed failure propagation modes across direct and indirect cou-
plings.
The approach demands for a fully automated configuration process ex-
ploiting two artefacts: i) SysML Block Definition Diagrams (BDDs) for cap-
turing the components hierarchy of a system with a proper detail level de-
scribing direct communication interfaces as well as redundancy levels; and ii)
Fault Trees (FTs) for capturing error modes, to be intended as internal pro-
cesses of components (or subsystems) leading a set of faults in manifesting a
specific failure; as well as, failure propagations among distinct components
(or subsystems) transforming a failure manifested as an output of a source
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component in an input fault of a destination component (in a direct or in-
direct relationship). Specifically, FT artefacts act as stochastic Fault Trees
with additional capabilities of modelling repeated events (both on basic and
intermediate events) leading to the generation of a Directed Acyclic Graph
thus producing dependencies among events (i.e., a same event can be set in
input to more than one gate), as well as introducing delays characterised by
probability density functions and routing probabilities over fault propaga-
tions.
The MDE approach also realises a round-trip engineering mechanism, pro-
viding, on the one hand, a forward engineering process, which enables au-
tomation of meta-model instances initialisation by exploiting design and reli-
ability artefacts, and, on the other hand, a reverse engineering process which
activates a co-evolution mechanism between the meta-model instances and
input artefacts guaranteeing that modifications applied over meta-model in-
stances automatically update design and reliability artefacts. At the same
time, the meta-model enables the automated generation of analysable quan-
titative models, in the shape of Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPNs).
Expected advantages of the meta-model adoption, within the proposed MDE
approach, are listed below:
• correct-by-construction configuration of structural information about
system compositions, through BDDs artefacts as initialisation input of
the proposed meta-model instances;
• the meta-model enables runtime verification of configuration confor-
mance/compliance with respect to designed artefacts, especially for the
CPS class exploiting self-representation mechanisms (e.g., to achieve
self-adaptation capabilities);
• configuration of system failure logic, mapping reliability artefacts, pro-
duced by reliability engineers, so as to reflect the underlying fault-to-
failure and failure-to-fault propagations within the meta-model;
• the meta-model is prepared for a fully automated generation of analysable
quantitative models in the shape of STPN;
• in turn, analysable models enable runtime and design-time quantitative
evaluations, also exploiting existent reliability tools (e.g., Möbius, Oris
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Tool) as well as simulations of failure logic;
• the meta-model, enriched with a set of transformation rules, supports
the co-evolution of its concrete configurations with respect to generated
output structural models (i.e., BDD), failure logic models (i.e., FT),
and analysable quantitative models (i.e., STPN).
Finally, a brief discussion about chosen artefacts for leading the MDE ap-
proach is here addressed.
On the one hand, structural information contained within BDDs can be
considered sufficient to handle high-level features about involved components
(or subsystems) and communication interfaces interconnecting them, while
neglecting functional and failure logic, which in the approach are delegated
to dedicated reliability artefacts (i.e., stochastic FTs). For these reasons,
any other richer model subsuming structural information contained within
BDDs, as intended in this dissertation, may be easily integrated in their
substitution. Some alternative abstractions may be: SysML Internal Block
Diagrams (IBDs), Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL), and
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs).
On the other hand, stochastic FTs have been chosen for their purely
functional perspective, fully decoupled from structural aspects, and their ex-
tensibility which enables decorations with stochastic features (i.e., to model
failure propagation timings). Thus, RBDs and “pure” Component Fault
Trees have been discarded inasmuch because of the strict pairing between
structural information and behavioural or failure logic information, limiting
expressiveness for high-level propagation couplings among not directly in-
terconnected components (i.e., representability for indirect couplings is not
provided).
The MDE approach has been included within a tool-chain perspective, through
a newborn and prototype tool, presented in Sect. 6, which implements the
proposed meta-model, offering a Java Application Programming Interface
or a as-a-service mode for the specification of the system hierarchy and its
failure logic, as well as for the export of derived STPN models.
Chapter 4
Meta-model specification
In this Chapter, a complete description and technical character-
isation of the proposed meta-model, introduced only as a concept
in Sect. 3.2, is reported.
In particular, in Sect. 4.1, the meta-model fragment providing
a system structural specification, capable of abstracting System
of Systems architectures is proposed. Sect. 4.2 focuses on: i)
the adopted reference taxonomy about failure logic; ii) the meta-
model fragment describing fault-to-failure processes, while denom-
inating failures, faults, and errors; iii) the meta-model fragment
describing failure-to-fault processes, modelling direct and indi-
rect couplings among components; iv) an overview of the whole
meta-model. Sect. 4.3 proposes a Model-Driven Engineering ap-
proach for initialising a whole meta-model instance from Block
Definition Diagrams, for providing an architectural description
of system composition, and stochastic Fault Trees artefacts, for
characterising the failure logic, with a practical example over a
basic scenario including a system hierarchy of three components.
In Sect. 4.4 a meta-model refinement addressing an adaptation
towards Product Line Engineering is illustrated, also demonstrat-
ing advantages in terms of co-evolution and configuration reuse,
with reference to the previous basic scenario.
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4.1 System structural specification
In several contexts where reliability and safety represent core requirements,
a well-structured software representation of the under-monitored system is
essential for supporting maintenance tasks and fault-tolerance policies by
providing software digital replicas with runtime/offline diagnostic and pre-
dictive capabilities, thus enabling conformance analysis methods, particu-
larly relevant in (self-)adaptive and re-configurable systems.
In these contexts, digital twins [113] offer a strong mechanism for provid-
ing a software abstraction on hardware counterparts, capturing operational
behaviours of physical assets while enabling agile control as well as facilitat-
ing diagnoses, process plannings, process optimisations, virtual prototyping,
and simulations.
In Sect. 3.2, under a Model-Driven Engineering perspective, the concept
of reference meta-model for representing structural and behavioural aspects
of a system has been introduced.
In Fig. 4.1, an UML Class Diagram fragment of the meta-model is re-
ported. It enables self-representation mechanisms for Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems (CPS), acting as a mean for designing software digital twins, aware of
















Figure 4.1: UML Class Diagram about a fragment of the meta-model of a
component-based system, depicting a system abstract specification in terms
of components hierarchies and communication interfaces.
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In particular, the meta-model depicts a System of Systems (i.e., the
class named System, for conciseness) as a hierarchical aggregation of distinct
hardware/software components (i.e., the Component class), interconnected
through communication interfaces (i.e., the CompositionPort class).
The proposed meta-model is agnostic on the typology of the modelled
system, fitting scenarios characterised by isolated systems as well as complex
SoS. An instance of System represents the monitored operative context as
convenient for reliability experts, thus it can be “a part of” or a whole system,
enabling fine-grained as well as coarse-grained digital configurations. Under
this scheme, an instance of Component does not own information about the
nature of its physical and concrete counterpart, thus it is not relevant if a
child element is an atomic component or a system itself (i.e. a subsystem).
The main Component which defines the higher-level system specification is
represented by the topLevelComponent attribute, referenced by the System
instance.
The software representation of the system comprises an abstract speci-
fication, which can be applied over many concrete installations of the same
physical configuration. This reflects the dualism between the concept of an
ideal product, identified by a model number, and the concrete product itself,
identified by its serial number.
4.2 System failure logic specification
The meta-model, introduced in Sect. 4.1, comprises the ground for the spec-
ification of faults, errors, and failures; in so doing, the abstract specification
of a system is able to capture both the system compositional structure and
its failure logic.
In order to clarify concepts surrounding the failure logic design, a brief in-
troduction about the reference taxonomy [7] for this meta-model is reported.
Relevant terms are here reported:
• an error is a deviation from the expected system state;
• a failure is a manifestation of an error, deviating at least one of the
system external states, thus producing tangible effects;
• a fault is one of the causes of an error and can be internal (i.e., a
fault activated by an endogenous process, internally originated by the
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component/subsystem itself, usually due to aging or manufacturing
defects) or external (i.e., a fault activated by an exogenous process,
originated from outside the affected component/subsystem).
Failure propagation insights can be captured within the meta-model, en-
hancing the abstract specification with error, failure, and fault concepts; as
represented in the fragment of Fig. 4.2, each Component instance maintains
a reference to its manifestable output failures (i.e., the FailureMode class)
which are strictly related to errors and their causes (i.e., the FaultMode
class), distinguishing also between internal and external faults (i.e., respec-
tively the EndogenousFaultMode and the ExogenousFaultMode classes, as

















Figure 4.2: UML Class Diagram about a fragment of the meta-model, de-
picting error modes characterisation for each system component.
tion process, describing the internal failure logic of a component is modelled
as an association class (i.e., the ErrorMode class) between the component
itself and the manifested failure. An error mode is here designed so as to
represent the Boolean logic expression (which can be easily mapped-in or
mapped-from a Fault Tree) of faults leading to the manifested failure.
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Note that classes mapping these dependability concepts are decorated
by the Mode suffix specification, which enlightens the role of abstract and
reusable specification of the meta-model, which can be applied over many
concrete installations of the same specification (i.e., the same meta-model
System instance). In so doing, the meta-model represents these concepts
in a general perspective of knowledge, while real-time occurrences of these
entities (e.g., during simulations) must be intended as their concretisations
(i.e., failures, faults, and errors).
ErrorMode and EndogenousFaultMode classes have been stochastically
characterised introducing probability density functions which respectively
model the time to failure (i.e., timeToFailurePDF ) and the fault arising (i.e.,
arisingPDF ) probability distributions so as to support quantitative analysis
over the meta-model. Exogenous faults, modelling external causes of errors,
are not stochastically characterised and should be derived at analysis time
extracting them from direct and indirect couplings information.
The failure-to-fault propagation processes can be captured within the meta-
model only considering existent couplings which describe propagation flows
of manifested failures towards external (i.e., exogenous) faults. This kind of
faults strictly depends on SoS nature: indeed, CPS, operating in contexts
such as Smart Cities, Industrial Internet of Things and Industry 4.0 [93,
100,117], promotes the integration of high-level communication mechanisms,
adopting software middlewares for brokering messages among subsystems
and high scale enterprise software agents.
In so doing, a CPS is designed so as to produce an emergent behaviour [54,
84], a collection of actions and patterns that cannot be predicted from iso-
lated behaviours of constituent systems but resulting from local cooperation
among subsystems and their environments. Modern systems intrinsically
own emergence [64], implementing in many cases, big data ingestion pro-
cesses, horizontal and vertical integration stages, and microservices orches-
tration patterns; thus enabling self-organising logic and emphasising the
need for studies about indirect failure propagation couplings, in addition to
direct ones.
In this architecture, role and responsibilities of the middleware becomes
crucial: in a classical IoT architecture [63], a message broker is usually
adopted for ingesting wide in-motion data streams, generated by a plethora
of perception devices. Therefore, the broker is responsible for routing and
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forwarding raw data to collector components, according to some policies.
Manifested failures within the perception layer, “alterating” messages con-
tents (e.g., reporting a wrong temperature), are inevitably propagated by
the broker. Altered messages may produce inner faults inside final recipi-
ents. Clearly, in this scenario, the broker can’t be considered as a failed or
faulty component, despite having contributed to the generation of indirect
couplings.
This kind of failure propagations cannot be effectively represented in the
previous fragments of the meta-model (i.e., Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2), which only
express direct couplings occurring along the compositional architecture de-
fined by intra-subsystem and inter-subsystems interfaces established by the
system specification (i.e., the CompositionPort class).
The meta-model has been thus enriched as shown in Fig. 4.3, so as to per-
mit specification of failure propagations occurring across indirect couplings
determined by use case scenarios and middlewares business logic, involving












Figure 4.3: UML Class Diagram about a fragment of the meta-model, de-
picting failure propagation logics of each system component.
direct and indirect couplings are now modelled through the introduction of
the PropagationPort class, in addition to the CompositionPort class pre-
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sented in Fig. 4.1, separating the compositional hierarchy from the failures
propagation logic. Each PropagationPort instance specifies how a Failure-
Mode manifested by a source Component affects another Component (i.e.,
affectedComponent), raising an exogenous fault (i.e., exogenousFaultMode).
Failure-to-fault processes may be decorated with a routingProbability deter-
mining the probability under which the failure mode instance of the source
component becomes an exogenous fault instance for the affected one.
The whole meta-model is reported in Fig. 4.4, where previous fragments
are combined all together. So, the meta-model constitutes the basis for an
executable software representation, opening the way to perform both fault-
to-failure and failure-to-fault propagation processes, deriving information
from useful artefacts (as described in Sect. 4.3).
In summary, the meta-model defines three primary entities: i) the Com-
positionPort class represents the system hierarchy specification in terms of
hardware/software communications among components, ii) the ErrorMode
class stochastically characterises the fault-to-failure mechanism, and iii) the
PropagationPort class describes the failure-to-fault propagation mechanism.
As a positive consequence, the entire software meta-model reflects the ab-
stract system specification, thus constituting a framework for designing and
testing product lines by enabling “offline” analyses. At the same time, these
abstract configurations can support “runtime” reliability analyses over many
concrete installations of the same system. Moreover, runtime event observa-
tions and anomalies detection can lead the refinement of stochastic charac-
terisation of endogenous faults.
4.3 A Round-Trip Engineering process
The meta-model enables a round-trip engineering process [73], leading, on
the one hand, the instantiation of the meta-model itself and, on the other
hand, the co-evolution of meta-model instances with adopted design and
reliability artefacts.
Bidirectional transformations rules are given so as to generate meta-
model instances, retrieving information from input artefacts (i.e., SysML
BDDs and stochastic FTs), as well as to obtain synchronised versions of the
structural and failure logic artefacts, starting from modifications on the ex-




































Figure 4.4: UML Class Diagram of the meta-model of a component-based
system, refined with failure propagation mechanisms.














Figure 4.5: Round-trip engineering process.
The instantiation of the meta-model requires an initialisation effort by the
domain experts; the complexity of managed information is based on a struc-
tural perspective, referred to system composition and system architecture,
but also on a dependability perspective, referred to reliability design choices
about system failure propagation processes and their stochastic characteri-
sation.
The overall effort is mitigated by the adoption of MDE practices consid-
ering that the initialisation of executable object instances of the meta-model
may be fully automated.
In particular, a concretisation of the presented meta-model fragment of
Fig. 4.3 may be automatically derived from SysML BDD diagrams1 by con-
sidering each block as a Component instance and each relationship between
blocks as a CompositionPort instance, connecting two distinct components
(see Alg. 1 in Sect. A.1 for details). A unique system is instantiated by
referring to the top level block of the BDD.
The reverse engineering process, extracting BDD artefacts from the exe-
cutable representation of the meta-model can be defined as a process visiting
the hierarchical configuration made by drawing a basic block for each Com-
ponent and interconnecting it with UML compositional relationship for each
child identified through its CompositionPort instances (see Alg. 3 in Sect. A.2
for details).
Practically, within a basic exemplary scenario of a system built over three
components as depicted in Fig. 4.6, the concrete domain of the meta-model
1Note that, conceptually, the same information may be similarly derived from more
detailed abstractions such as SysML IBDs, AADL artefacts.
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related to the system compositional hierarchy would be instantiated as in









Figure 4.6: SysML Block Definition Diagram of a system S, composed by
a top-level component, named C, with two children components, named A
and B.
S: System C: Component








Figure 4.7: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input
data provided by BDD of Fig. 4.6.
The failure logic described within the fragment of Fig. 4.4 may be automat-
ically derived from FTs artefacts, adopting a correct denomination of faults
and failures of each modelled component within the system hierarchy.
In order to properly configure the propagation mechanisms within the
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executable representation, extracting useful information from stochastic FTs,
it is relevant to remember the fault classification, distinguishing between
internal and external faults:
• internal faults, named endogenous faults, arise autonomously within
components and are mainly caused by factory defects, natural obsoles-
cence, or degradation processes;
• external faults, named exogenous faults, arise as input faults propa-
gated from external components, depending not only on direct cou-
plings, derived from the compositional hierarchy, but also on indirect
couplings due to data-level dependencies, use case scenarios and busi-




















Figure 4.8: Stochastic FT artefact of failure logics for the system in the
running example.
With reference to the previous exemplary scenario, the stochastic FT2 de-
2As stated in Sect. 3.2, the adopted FT artefacts can be considered as stochastic FTs
able to model repeated events (both basic and intermediate events) as well as to provide
a stochastic characterisation of propagation delays through probability density functions,
decorating edges with distribution labels, and routing probabilities, reported within notes.
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picted in Fig. 4.8 can be automatically translated into the UML Object
Diagrams of Figs. 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, built over the meta-model, respecting
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Figure 4.9: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input
data provided by FT of Fig. 4.8.
On the one hand, the fault-to-failure propagation has been interpreted
through an intra-component mode, describing how faults may lead a compo-
nent to manifest failures over time. The executable software representations
depicted in Figs. 4.9 and 4.10 embed fault-to-failure propagation mechanisms
within the ErrorMode class, which characterises stochastically the internal
behaviour of B and C components, exploiting their denominated fault modes
and failure modes. In particular, in the case of B component (see Fig. 4.9),
the output failure, related to a specific error mode (i.e., B ErrorMode1 ), is
modelled through Boolean logic expressions of occurred internal faults (i.e.,
B Fault1, B Fault2 ), enriched with an exponential probability density func-
tion with lambda equal to 3 (i.e., timeToFailurePDF ). At the same time, in
Fig. 4.10, the error mode (i.e., C ErrorMode2 ) describing the fault-to-failure
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Figure 4.10: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input










Figure 4.11: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input
data provided by FT of Fig. 4.8.
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of C component leading to C Failure2 shows the case of an exogenous fault
mode (i.e., C Fault3 ), where the B Failure1 failure mode of an external com-
ponent (i.e., B) acts as an input fault for C (i.e., subtending a failure-to-fault
propagation).
On the other hand, the failure-to-fault propagation has been interpreted
through an inter-components mode over the system hierarchy, describing how
an output failure of a lower level component may affect other higher level
components. The executable software representation depicted in Fig. 4.11
embeds failure-to-fault propagation mechanisms within the PropagationPort
class, whose instances relate output failures of a component acting as in-
ner faults for other distinct components. In particular, the failure mode
B Failure1 (i.e., the propagatedFailureMode), acting as the exogenous fault
mode C Fault3 (i.e., instantiated as an ExogenousFaultMode object) of C
component (i.e., the affectedComponent), is mapped in a PropagationPort
instance with B component as its source.
A formalised procedure for automatically mapping system FTs (decorated
with temporal probability distributions over basic events or gate nodes) in
the meta-model failure logic (see Alg. 5 in Sect. A.3 for details) is here sum-
marised through a textual procedure composed of 3 phases:
1. for each error mode, the first phase aims at identifying confined sub-
trees, confining internal behaviours (i.e., error modes) of each compo-
nent3.
(a) failure modes of the FT act as boundaries separating the upper
sub-tree from the lower sub-tree;
(b) in so doing, each sub-tree owns a root node as top-event failure
mode, and a set of leaves which represents internal faults as basic-
events or external faults as propagated failure modes;
(c) and a set of intermediate events, defined as a structure of logical
gates combining basic events and lower level failure modes.
2. for each identified sub-tree, the second phase aims at instantiating an
ErrorMode, reflecting fault-to-failure propagation mechanisms of each
component.
3In general, the top-event of a sub-tree must be a failure mode related to a single
component, while the leaves of a sub-tree are lower-level failure modes of some components
or basic events (acting as fault mode).
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(a) the top-event of the sub-tree is mapped in an outputFailureMode
instance of the FailureMode class;
(b) each basic event of the sub-tree is mapped in an inputFaultMode
instance of the EndogenousFaultMode class;
(c) each propagated failure mode leaf of the sub-tree is mapped in a
inputFaultMode instance of the ExogenousFaultMode class.
3. the third phase aims at identifying the failure-to-fault propagations
among components.
(a) each boundary failure mode, acting as a leaf in the upper sub-tree
and as a top-event in the lower one, is mapped in a propagation
instance of the PropagationPort class, interconnecting the prop-
agatedFailureMode from the source component with the exoge-
nousFaultMode instance of ExogenousFaultMode of the affected
component.
The reverse engineering process (see Alg. 9 in Sect. A.4 for details) leading to
the generation of FT artefacts, starting from the meta-model instances, may
be defined as a Top-Down visit of each highest-level failure mode (acting as
the top-event of a FT) of the failure logic specification, by applying recur-
sively these transformations rules: each ErrorMode instance is associated to
a sub-tree for which the enablingCondition defines logical gates combination
of sub-tree events. Each sub-tree is delimited by a failure mode of a Compo-
nent (acting as the top-event) and EndogenousFaultMode instances (acting
as basic events) or ExogenousFaultMode instances. Finally, the procedure
must be applied recursively on each FailureMode instance related to each
ExogenousFaultMode instance within a PropagationPort instance, identify-
ing its sub-tree and connecting it to the exogenous fault event.
Note that, the MDE approach requires that domain experts provide a stochas-
tic characterisation of the failure logic in the shape of stochastic FTs, so as to
complete the configuration of the executable meta-model. This topic is not
covered within the dissertation, but in principle probability density distribu-
tions may be based on information derived from classical FMEA/FMECA
analyses and technical data-sheets, including Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
estimations provided by industrial manufacturers, as well as from custom
conditions for what-if analysis processes.
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Furthermore, the proposed MDE approach must not be regarded as a
constrained process, as the idea is to define a universal ontology able to model
relevant information for failure logic propagations and their timed analysis.
In so doing, the approach leverages a core meta-model, whose concretisation
is here illustrated by automated processes adopting BDDs and FTs.
In a wider perspective, the selected input abstractions can be obtained
also starting from alternative common practice and/or domain-specific arte-
facts: indeed, BDDs can be substituted with AADL [34] documents for em-
bedded systems scenarios, while a basic failure logic indication can be derived
through mapping techniques applied over different abstractions (e.g., RBDs
can be converted in FTs, as described in [116], while through FPTN mod-
ules is possible to built CFTs, which approximate FTs, as described in [47])
though requiring additional efforts in modelling stochastic characterisation,
repeated events, as well as eventual indirect couplings occurring on the data-
level.
4.4 Meta-model refinement for Product Lines
Complex systems including several hardware/software components may be
subject to evolutive variations in their concrete installations, which may be
led by adaptations of the offered products or services to business or customer
needs as well as by tailoring stages of their variable constituent parts within
domain contexts. In many other cases, continuous system maintenance pro-
cesses, adding, removing, or substituting some components in operative in-
stallations, unintentionally, produce kinds of system families, exacerbating
the resulting complexity.
These systems families, known as Product Lines, take the name of Multi
Product Lines [53] for large-scale or ultra-large-scale software-intensive sys-
tems managed by different organisational units, as in the case of Interwoven
Systems or Federations of Systems.
Product Line Engineering [6,82] may support complexity management within
design and maintenance stages, providing useful approaches and strategies
for reducing development costs and deployment times, enhancing system
quality, and coping with an organised system evolution. The survey in [10]
describes how the values of variation modelling are perceived in the indus-
trial contexts, highlighting its importance in the management of existing
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variability, in the product configuration, in requirements specification, in
the derivation of products, as well as in the design and architecture planning
of variability.
The modelling of product lines requires a deep domain expertise for provid-
ing a sufficient system representation capturing product families variations.
For these reasons, the proposed meta-model should be enhanced, within its
structural parts, in order to act as an ontology with the capability of repre-
senting variability. Among variability units [10] (e.g., features, configuration
options, calibration parameters, decisions), the meta-model reported within
the fragment of Fig. 4.12, extending the previous fragment of Fig. 4.1, lever-

















Figure 4.12: UML Class Diagram about a fragment of the meta-model, de-
picting in a Product Line Engineering perspective the structural, depicting a
system family abstract specification in terms of components hierarchies and
communication interfaces subject to variation points.
Specifically, the System class has been renamed in SystemFamily with the
further addition of alternatives attribute, which models a collection of top-
level components as available options. De facto, each component interprets
the role of component family; thus the previous Component class has been
renamed in ComponentFamily.
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The VariationPoint class has been introduced so as to model variants of
system component, listing and denominating alternative configurations for
each parent component family. Note that, in terms of numerousness, a com-
ponent family should have at least one alternative concrete configuration.
Besides, the association class named CompositionPort, previously modelled
on the self-relationship between parent and children instances of the Com-
ponent class, while preserving its original meaning, has now been moved on
the aggregation between VariationPoint and ComponentFamily classes.
In so doing, the concept of product line has been primarily declined in a
structural perspective: alternative variations of a single component have to
be intended as different children configurations and architectural specifica-
tions. Trivially, atomic component variations without children are recognis-
able by the absence of children instances of type ComponentFamily.
The refinement led the ComponentFamily class to act as the high-level
concept of a component (i.e., the structural and functional role interpreted
for the whole system), while the VariationPoint class effectively models con-
crete instances of the components, as alternative configurations.
Consequently, the failure logic has been adapted so as to be referred to
concrete instances: ErrorMode, FailureMode, FaultMode, and Propagation-
Port classes have been detached from the Component class and attached to
the VariationPoint class, maintaining their original semantics, as depicted
in Fig. 4.13. Indeed, it’s quite clear that the failure logic of each system
component does not reside within the component family but in its effective
alternative configurations, which may operate differently even providing dif-
ferent functionalities (e.g., in an IoT system, the simple addition of a new
sensor type may affect the failure logic by producing data-level indirect cou-
plings over ingested samples and active filtering policies).
The presented round-trip engineering process applied to the proposed meta-
model remains valid also for this refined version, which maintains the capa-
bility of enabling automated initialisation as well as co-evolution mechanisms
with respect to system architectural models (i.e., SysML BDDs) and reliabil-
ity artefacts (i.e., stochastic FTs). Indeed, the VariationPoint of the refined
model interprets the same roles and responsibilities of the previous Compo-
nent class; furthermore, the introduction of a variation point at some level
of the system hierarchy imposes only the instatiation of the component (or





































Figure 4.13: UML Class Diagram of the whole meta-model of a component-
based system, refined with failure propagation mechanisms and variation
points in a product line perspective.
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subsystem) specification which may be derived from BDDs as described in
Sect. 4.3: previous system configurations are preserved and the reuse of both
structural and failure logic instances is guaranteed.
It is required only the update of newly introduced components in terms
of error modes, failure modes and fault modes, characterising fault-to-failure,
and induced direct and indirect couplings over ancestor components, charac-
terising failure-to-fault. Within the MDE perspective, also the initialisation
of the failure logic for product lines can be easily driven by reliability arte-
facts (e.g., FTs) in a modular approach combining information over changed
components (or subsystems).
In practice, with reference to the exemplary basic system scenario of Fig. 4.6,
a variant of C, introducing a new D component, is depicted in Fig. 4.14. The
resulting executable representation of the structure of the variant is reported



















Figure 4.14: SysML Block Definition Diagram of the system S as product
variant of the system in Fig. 4.6, adding a new component named D.
Also the failure logic has been updated (see Fig. 4.16) so as to represent
the impact of the D component in system failure propagation mechanisms,
affecting the C component with the influence of D Failure1 (i.e., the failure-
to-fault coupling C and D components is mapped with D Failure1 acting as
C Fault5 ).
The failure logic concretisation of the variant is reported in the UML












































































Figure 4.15: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input
data provided by BDD of Fig. 4.14.
54 Meta-model specification

























Figure 4.16: Stochastic FT artefact of failure logic for the system in the
running example, where C component has a variation point.
UML Object Diagrams of Figs. 4.15 and 4.17 highlight the preservation of
previous configurations, enabling the evolution over time of configurations
with respect to changes on installed systems; furthermore, the instances reuse
is demonstrated by the objects of black colour. Specifically, in the UML Ob-
ject Diagram of Fig. 4.15, two alternative configurations of the C component
family are depicted, the first (i.e., C1) refers to the system represented in
the SysML BDD of Fig. 4.6 while the second (i.e., C2) the one of Fig. 4.14.
The example also enlightens how the meta-model refined for product lines
reduces the effort to be spent by human technicians in response to config-
uration changes through the standardised adoption of modelling artefacts
related to isolated component variations during the initialisation process.
In so doing, the modular composition of isolated sub-components information
enables the extraction of the overall system failure logic in a FT artefact,
summarising all behaviours, as well as the generation of executable timed
analysis models for reliability purposes.

































































































Figure 4.17: UML Object Diagram built on the meta-model, reading input
data provided by FT of Fig. 4.16.
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Chapter 5
Meta-model to Timed Analysis
model transformation
In this Chapter a description of the transformation rules lead-
ing the generation of timed analysis models in the formalism of
Stochastic Time Petri Net (STPN), starting from meta-model in-
stances, is provided.
In particular, in Sect. 5.1 syntax and semantics of the adopted
STPN model are described; in Sect. 5.2 formal transformation
rules from a meta-model instance to an STPN are provided; while,
in Sect. 5.3 an overview of main quantitative analysis techniques
is reported within a tool-chain perspective.
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5.1 Stochastic Time Petri Nets as Timed Anal-
ysis models
The meta-model, described in Chapter 4, has been integrated within a MDE
approach with the aim of facilitating the initialisation of executable software
representations of system hierarchies and their failure logic. The approach
also enables a further generation of general purpose timed models, able of
characterising temporal behaviours of systems under modelling, so as to ap-
ply quantitative analysis techniques (e.g., numerical or simulated).
The mathematical formalism selected at these purposes is a stochastic model,
specified as a Stochastic Time Petri Net (STPN) [109]. The approach is ac-
companied by a procedure for the automated generation of STPN models
from the meta-model, as described in Sect. 5.2.
STPNs are a class of Stochastic Petri Nets designed to specify concur-
rent timed systems where transitions (depicted as vertical bars) represent
activities, places (depicted as circles) represent discrete components of the
logical state with values encoded by a number of tokens (depicted as dots),
and directed arcs from input places to transitions and from transitions to
output places represent token moves occurring at the execution of activities.
A transition is enabled when all its input places contain at least one
token, and its firing will remove a token from each input place and add one
to each output place. The time elapsing from the enabling to the firing of a
transition is a random variable (possibly imposing minimum and maximum
duration). Besides, the choice between transitions with equal time to fire is
solved by a random switch determined by probabilistic weights.
Syntax An STPN is a tuple 〈P, T,A−, A+, B, U,R, EFT ,LFT ,F ,W, Z〉
where: P is the set of places; T is the set of transitions; A− ⊆ P × T and
A+ ⊆ T × P are the sets of precondition and postcondition, respectively;
B, U , and R associate each transition t ∈ T with an enabling function
B(t) : M → {true,false} to restrict the enabling of a transition with
general constraints on token counts, an update function U(t) :M→M to
specify additional updates of token counts after the firing of a transition, and
a reset set R(t) ⊆ T to force the restart of selected transitions, respectively,
where M is the set of reachable markings m : P → N; EFT : T → Q+0 and
LFT : T → Q+0 ∪ {∞} associate each transition with an earliest and a latest
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firing time, respectively, such that EFT (t) ≤ LFT (t) ∀ t ∈ T ; F : T → F st
associates each transition with a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
with support [EFT (t),LFT (t)]; W : T → R+ associates each transition
with a weight; Z : T → N associates each transition with a priority. A
place p is termed an input or an output place for a transition t if 〈p, t〉 ∈ A−
or 〈t, p〉 ∈ A+, respectively. A transition t is called immediate (IMM) if
[EFT (t),LFT (t)] = [0, 0] and timed otherwise; a timed transition t is termed
exponential (EXP) if Ft(x) = 1− e−λx over [0,∞] for some rate λ ∈ R+0 and
general (GEN) otherwise; a GEN transition t is called deterministic (DET) if
EFT (t) = LFT (t) and distributed otherwise. For each distributed transition
t, it is assumed that Ft is absolutely continuous over its support and thus
that there exists a Probability Density Function (PDF) ft such that Ft(x) =∫ x
0
ft(y)dy.
Semantics The state of an STPN is a pair 〈m, τ〉, wherem ∈M is a marking
and τ : T → R+0 associates each transition with a time-to-fire. A transition
t is enabled by m if m assigns at least one token to each of its input places
and the enabling function B(t)(m) evaluates to true; an enabled transition
is firable if its time-to-fire is not higher than that of any other enabled tran-
sition. When multiple transitions are firable, one of them is selected to fire
with probability Prob{t is selected} = W(t)/
∑
ti∈T f (s)W(ti), where T
f (s)
is the set of firable transitions in s. When t fires, s = 〈m, τ〉 is replaced by
s′ = 〈m′, τ ′〉, where m′ is derived from m by: i) removing a token from each
input place of t and assigning zero tokens to the places in L(t) ⊆ P , which
yields an intermediate marking mtmp, ii) adding a token to each output
place of t, and iii) and applying the update function U(t) to the resulting
marking. Transitions enabled both by mtmp and by m
′ are said persistent,
while those enabled by m′ but not by mtmp or m are said newly-enabled;
if t is still enabled after its own firing, it is regarded as newly enabled [12].
The time-to-fire of persistent transitions is reduced by the time elapsed in
s, while the time-to-fire of newly-enabled transitions takes a random value
sampled according to their CDF.
5.2 Deriving an STPN model of failure logic
The specification of the failure logic embedded within the meta-model of
Figs. 4.4, 4.13 can be translated into a corresponding STPN model (see
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Alg. 12 in Sect. A.5 for details), thus enabling co-evolution mechanisms be-
tween meta-model configurations and quantitative models for analysis and
simulation of timed failure logic.
The transformation may be realised applying the following derivation
rules based on three distinct sub-procedures for endogenous faults occur-
rences, fault-to-failure propagations, and failure-to-fault propagations (i.e.,
exogenous faults occurrences), enlightening and quantifying components re-
liability measures.
First, endogenous faults occurrences are mapped into an STPN submodel
defined by two places and one timed transition, representing the activation,
the occurrence, and the time at which the fault will occur, respectively. In so
doing, see Fig. 5.1, for each EndogenousFaultMode of the meta-model three
elements are mapped in the STPN:
• the place named Endogenous Fault Process represents the endogenous
process leading the involved system component to a deviation from its
expected status. This place is marked with one token, to enable the
transition;
• the place named Endogenous Fault Occurrence represents a raised in-
ternal fault;
• a single general transition stochastically characterises the process lead-
ing to the raise of the internal fault. The transition models the prob-
ability density function, defined by the arisingPDF attribute within
the EndogenousFaultMode instance.
Figure 5.1: The STPN submodel of an endogenous fault process.
Secondly, each fault-to-failure propagation is mapped into a dedicated sub-
model composed by an input place containing one token, a timed transition
decorated with an enabling condition (corresponding to the Boolean expres-
sion defined inside one of the error modes of the component), and an output
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place where the token will be moved to, when the failure occurs. In so do-
ing, see Fig. 5.2, for each ErrorMode of the meta-model three elements are
mapped in the STPN:
• the place named Fault-to-Failure Process represents the active fault-to-
failure process leading the involved system component to manifest a
failure. This place is marked with one token, to enable the transition;
• the place named Failure Occurrence represents a manifested failure;
• a single general transition stochastically characterises the process lead-
ing to failure manifestation. The transition models the probability den-
sity function, defined by the timeToFailurePDF attribute within the
ErrorMode instance. It is also decorated with an enabling condition de-
fined in the enablingCondition attribute (within the same ErrorMode)
of type BooleanExpression, referencing Endogenous Fault Occurrence
and Exogenous Fault Occurrence places.
Figure 5.2: The STPN submodel of fault-to-failure mechanism.
Finally, each output place of a fault-to-failure submodel may act as an input
place for a failure-to-fault submodel characterised by an immediate transition
that moves the token to an output place representing the occurrence of an
exogenous fault for some coupled component (see Fig. 5.3 for the case of a
routing probability equal to 1, and Fig. 5.4 otherwise). In so doing, for each
PropagationPort of the meta-model:
• the place named Failure Occurrence represents the propagatedFailure-
Mode attribute, within the PropagationPort class, originated by a pre-
vious fault-to-failure process. This place is already built by a fault-to-
failure sub-procedure;
• a place named Exogenous Fault Occurrence is instantiated for the cur-
rent ExogenousFaultMode instance;
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• if not already present, a single immediate transition outgoing from the
Failure Occurrence place is instantiated.
Figure 5.3: The STPN submodel of exogenous fault processes, representing
the failure-to-fault propagation mechanism, in the case of a single exogenous
fault and with a routing probability equal to 1.
Figure 5.4: The STPN submodel of exogenous fault processes, representing
the failure-to-fault propagation mechanism, in the case of a single exogenous
fault and with a routing probability different from 1. Note that the propaga-
tion of the token from the Failure Occurrence place to the Exogenous Fault
Occurrence place is now (with respect to Fig. 5.3) intermediated by a Exoge-
nous Fault Router place, with two outgoing transitions weighted accordingly
to the routing probability p.
Note that failure-to-fault propagations may affect several components in-
volving many exogenous fault processes and a single failure may act as mul-
tiple external faults. In these cases, the Failure Occurrence place is not
duplicated, nor is duplicated its outgoing transition, which is effectively con-
nected with each Exogenous Fault Occurrence place. An example is reported
in Fig. 5.5 where a single failure is propagated to three different exogenous
faults, through three different PropagationPort instances, one of which is
subject to a routing probability different from 1.
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Figure 5.5: The STPN submodel of exogenous fault processes, representing
multiple failure-to-fault propagation mechanisms. One of its propagation
has a routing probability different from 1 (i.e., the propagation towards the
Exogenous Fault Occurrence C place).
In conclusion, considering again the system depicted in Fig. 4.6 composed
by 3 components (i.e., A, B, and C) with a failure logic depicted in the
input FT artefacts of Fig. 5.6, leading the configuration of a meta-model in-
stance for generating the subsequent STPN of Fig. 5.7 through the provided
transformation rules.1
The most interesting aspect of the failure logic is the double propagation
of the failure mode named B Failure1, acting as an exogenous fault mode
both for the A component (i.e., as A Fault2 ), and for the C component
(i.e, as C Fault3 ), thus producing a directed acyclic graph in the reliability
artefact. This double propagation is reflected by the generated STPN, in the
outgoing transition of B Failure1 place, moving and duplicating the token
in A Fault2 and in C Fault3 places through an intermediate router place for
handling the routing probability.
1In Fig. 5.7, some labels of places or transitions have been suppressed for readability
purposes.























C_Fault2 with P = 0.35
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acts as




A_Fault2 with P = 1
and
C_Fault3 with P = 0.6
Figure 5.6: Stochastic FTs providing the failure logic configuration of the
STPN in Fig. 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: The STPN model of failure logic for the the system depicted in
Fig. 4.6 composed by 3 components (i.e., A, B, and C) with a failure logic
depicted in the input FT artefacts of Fig. 5.6. Note that have been generated:
7 “Endogenous Faults Submodels” , one for each EndogenousFault instance
(thus, one for each basic event of the FT); 5 “Fault-to-Failure Submodels”,
one for each FailureMode on top of a bounded sub-tree, each one representing
an ErrorMode instance; finally, 4 “Failure-to-Fault Submodels”, one for each
PropagationPort, each one identifiable in the FT as a textual note connected
to an intermediate FailureMode.
66 Meta-model to Timed Analysis model transformation
5.3 Configuring STPN models in a tool-chain
perspective
STPN models have been selected as general models able of capturing and
characterising the temporal behaviour of a system in terms of failure logic,
but in order to enable concrete quantitative analysis over these mathematical
abstractions a customisation is required considering that solution techniques
strictly depend on the stochastic parametrisation of the models.
Conceptually, while general distributions of the STPN may model any
possible probability density function, as done by the meta-model, concrete
implementations of the STPN should also account for quantitative solutions,
offered by state-of-the-art tools. Thus, in these cases, an approximation
strategy may be required to perform feasible analysis.2
While, in this perspective, single run simulations of STPN behaviours as
well as Monte Carlo [77] simulations may exploit any possible stochastic
distribution (as long as a sample of that distribution may be automatically
generated); quantitative analysis approaches require adaptation or approxi-
mation of stochastic distributions to supported ones:
• Markovian transient and steady-state analysis [98] may be applied over
STPN models with only exponential (EXP) and immediate (IMM)
transitions, known in literature as GSPN models, which subtend
Continuous-Time Markov Chains processes. In practice, stochastic dis-
tributions of the meta-model should be approximated with markovian
ones (e.g., a single exponential distribution, an erlang distribution, or
a phase-type approximation [56]);
• Markov Regenerative Processes (MRPs) may be exploited so as to eval-
uate transient and steady-state probabilities with [41] or without [55]
the “enabling restriction” (i.e., at most one expolynomial transition is
enabled in each state) [21]. In practice, stochastic distributions of the
meta-model should be approximated with expolynomial ones, paying
attention to further limitations;
• Non-deterministic analysis [107] over compact representations of the
dense set of timed states that can be reached by STPN models, sup-
2Expected values should be equal to MTTFs of related components described by tech-
nical sheets, while higher-order moments may drive further refinements.
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porting verification of qualitative properties of a model (e.g, whether
a marking can be reached). In practice, identifying or approximating
boundaries of the stochastic distributions within the model.
In so doing, in a tool-chain perspective, STPN models may also be exploited
in different analysis tools (e.g., GreatSPN [3], Mercury [95], TimeNET [119])
or exported in different output formats so as to exploit their representations
as formal inputs to specific tools: for example, the adoption of Petri Net
Markup Language (PNML), an XML-based interchange format for Petri
Nets, enables analysis based on several tools (e.g., ITS Tools [101], PNML
Framework [52]); while the adoption of XPN format, a proprietary XML
markup, enables the integration in Oris Tool [78].
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Chapter 6
Towards a Tool for Reliability
Analysis
In this Chapter a description of how the MDE approach and
its related round-trip engineering process can be adapted within
a concrete software implementation is reported. The proposed
meta-model constitutes the core element for the realisation of a
newborn tool, enabling the modelling of system specification and
failure logic, as well as, supporting the generation of STPNs.
Specifically, the MDE approach within a tool-chain perspective is
detailed in Sect. 6.1, and an overview of prototypical Java API,
designed and implemented for supporting a programmatic defini-
tion of meta-model instances is described in Sect. 6.2. Finally,
a brief description of a REST service implementation of the for-
ward engineering process, laying the foundations for the tool in a
as-a-service mode, is described in Sect. 6.3.
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6.1 The MDE approach in a tool-chain per-
spective
The proposed MDE approach, leveraging on the meta-model described in
Chapter 4, enables a round-trip engineering process as depicted in the sum-
mary image of Fig. 6.1.
On the one hand, the System specification artefacts (i.e., SysML BDDs)
and failure logic artefacts (i.e., stochastic FTs) are given in input to the meta-
model so as to activate an initialisation process of an executable instance,
thus realising the so called forward engineering process. On the other hand, a
reverse engineering process is supported by the meta-model, able to perceive
external manual modifications which can be reflected at runtime so as to
update all input artefacts.
At the same time, the meta-model enables the automated generation of
STPNs, adopting a set of transformation rules, as described in Chapter 5.
For the sake of concreteness, in order to reap the benefits of the theorised
MDE approach on concrete case studies, a tool implementation is needed
for automatising all the underlying processes; also identifying convenient in-
put/output data formats, target tools and frameworks, as well as exposing
an Application Programming Interface (API) for runtime modifications of
executable meta-model instances.
Specifically, the Oris Tool has been identified as the target analysis frame-
work, requiring in input the XPN format for STPN representation; through















Figure 6.1: Summary of the round-trip engineering process based on the
meta-model.
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an instance of a STPN and export it in the XPN format. Besides, a cus-
tom Java API supports the initialisation of the meta-model and subsequent
runtime modifications, as described in Sect. 6.2, also laying the foundations
for the design and development of a prototypical tool as-a-service, within a
cloud environment, as described in Sect. 6.3.

































Figure 6.2: The designed workflow of the prototype tool, in the tool-chain
perspective.
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Fig. 6.2 reports the designed workflow of the prototype tool, within a tool-
chain perspective, highlighting internal processes actually implemented by
the tool (i.e., processes bounded within the grey box) as well as input/output
artefacts. Specifically:
• the Process 1, actually manually done by Java programmers but in
practice automatable through the identification of specific data for-
mats, transforms SysML BDDs into the specific Java code, exposed by
the tool API;
• the Process 2, actually manually done by Java programmers but in
practice automatable through the identification of specific data for-
mats, transforms stochastic FTs into the specific Java code, exposed
by the tool API;
• the Process 3, manually done by Java programmers over the Java API,
implements runtime transformations over the initialised meta-model
instance;
• the Process 4 is responsible for the automated export of SysML Block
Definition Diagram artefacts;
• the Process 5 is responsible for the automated export of stochastic FT
artefacts;
• the Process 6 exploits the Sirio API so as to generate STPN executable
models;
• the Process 7 exposes a set of built-in analysis techniques, offered by
the Sirio API;
• the Process 8 provides functionalities to export an STPN model in the
XPN format, analysable via Oris Tool.
While the actual implementation of the tool1 provides only Processes 3,
6, and 8, as soon as adequate data format will be identified for SysML
BDDs and for stochastic FTs, a concrete implementation also for remaining
processes will be provided.
1Available for public access at https://faultflow.dinfo.unifi.it
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6.2 The Java API
In this section, the specification of the system hierarchy and its failure logic
through the prototypical Java API is described.
Considering again the system depicted in Fig. 4.6 composed by 3 compo-
nents (i.e., A, B, and C) combined in a hierarchy where C represents the
(root) parent of A and B, and with a failure logic defined by FTs of Fig. 5.6
(which, practically, are a Directed Acyclic Graph), listing 6.1 illustrates the
usage of the API to programmatically build the hierarchy of the system S
with its CompositionPort and PropagationPort instances, also characterising
its failure logic in terms of failure-to-fault and fault-to-failure mechanisms.
Finally, API also provides a static method (i.e., XPNExporter.export(system,
“file-name.xpn”)) implementing the automated transformation from the meta-
model instance of the system to a STPN representation, realised accordingly
to the format of Oris Tool.
1 HashMap <String , FaultMode > faultModes = new HashMap <>();
2
3 // System hierarchy definition
4 System system = new System("S");
5 Component a = new Component("A");
6 Component b = new Component("B");
7 Component c = new Component("C");
8 system.addComponent(a, b, c);
9 system.setTopLevelComponent(c);
10 CompositionPort ac = new CompositionPort(a, c);
11 CompositionPort bc = new CompositionPort(b, c);
12 c.addChildren(ac, bc);
13
14 // Endogenous Fault Modes definition
15 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_A1 = new EndogenousFaultMode("A_Fault1");
16 enFM_A1.setArisingPDF("dirac (3)");
17 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_A3 = new EndogenousFaultMode("A_Fault3");
18 enFM_A3.setArisingPDF("exp (10)");
19 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_A4 = new EndogenousFaultMode("A_Fault4");
20 enFM_A4.setArisingPDF("dirac (3)");
21 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_A5 = new EndogenousFaultMode("A_Fault5");
22 enFM_A5.setArisingPDF("exp (10)");
23 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_B1 = new EndogenousFaultMode("B_Fault1");
24 enFM_B1.setArisingPDF("dirac (3)");
25 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_B2 = new EndogenousFaultMode("B_Fault2");
26 enFM_B2.setArisingPDF("erlang (10 ,5)");
27 EndogenousFaultMode enFM_C4 = new EndogenousFaultMode("C_Fault4");
28 enFM_C4.setArisingPDF("uniform (20 ,40)");
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29
30 faultModes.put(enFM_A1.getName (), enFM_A1);
31 faultModes.put(enFM_A3.getName (), enFM_A3);
32 faultModes.put(enFM_A4.getName (), enFM_A4);
33 faultModes.put(enFM_A5.getName (), enFM_A5);
34 faultModes.put(enFM_B1.getName (), enFM_B1);
35 faultModes.put(enFM_B2.getName (), enFM_B2);
36 faultModes.put(enFM_C4.getName (), enFM_C4);
37
38 // Exogenous Fault Modes definition
39 ExogenousFaultMode exFM_A2 = new ExogenousFaultMode("A_Fault2");
40 ExogenousFaultMode exFM_C1 = new ExogenousFaultMode("C_Fault1");
41 ExogenousFaultMode exFM_C2 = new ExogenousFaultMode("C_Fault2");
42 ExogenousFaultMode exFM_C3 = new ExogenousFaultMode("C_Fault3");
43
44 faultModes.put(exFM_A2.getName (), exFM_A2);
45 faultModes.put(exFM_C1.getName (), exFM_C1);
46 faultModes.put(exFM_C2.getName (), exFM_C2);
47 faultModes.put(exFM_C3.getName (), exFM_C3);
48
49 // Failure modes of A and B Components definition
50 FailureMode fM_A1 = new FailureMode("A_Failure1");
51 ErrorMode eM_A1 = new ErrorMode("A_ToFailure1");
52 eM_A1.addInputFaultMode(enFM_A1 , exFM_A2 , enFM_A3);
53 eM_A1.addOutputFailureMode(fM_A1);




57 FailureMode fM_A2 = new FailureMode("A_Failure2");
58 ErrorMode eM_A2 = new ErrorMode("A_ToFailure2");
59 eM_A2.addInputFaultMode(enFM_A4 , enFM_A5);
60 eM_A2.addOutputFailureMode(fM_A2);
61 eM_A2.setEnablingCondition("A_Fault4 && A_Fault5", faultModes);
62 eM_A2.setPDF("exp (5)");
63
64 a.addErrorMode(eM_A1 , eM_A2);
65
66 FailureMode fM_B1 = new FailureMode("B_Failure1");
67 ErrorMode eM_B1 = new ErrorMode("B_ToFailure1");
68 eM_B1.addInputFaultMode(enFM_B1 , enFM_B2);
69 eM_B1.addOutputFailureMode(fM_B1);





75 // Propagation Ports definition
76 a.addPropagationPorts(
77 new PropagationPort(fM_A1 , exFM_C1 , c),
78 new PropagationPort(fM_A2 , exFM_C2 , c, 0.35));
79 b.addPropagationPorts(
80 new PropagationPort(fM_B1 , exFM_A2 , a, 0.6),
81 new PropagationPort(fM_B1 , exFM_C3 , c));
82
83 // Failure Modes of C Component definition
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84 FailureMode fM_C1 = new FailureMode("C_Failure1");
85 ErrorMode eM_C1 = new ErrorMode("C_ToFailure1");
86 eM_C1.addInputFaultMode(exFM_C1 , exFM_C2);
87 eM_C1.addOutputFailureMode(fM_C1);
88 eM_C1.setEnablingCondition("C_Fault1 && C_Fault2", faultModes);
89 eM_C1.setPDF("dirac (0)");
90
91 FailureMode fM_C2 = new FailureMode("C_Failure2");
92 ErrorMode eM_C2 = new ErrorMode("C_ToFailure2");
93 eM_C2.addInputFaultMode(exFM_C3 , enFM_C4);
94 eM_C2.addOutputFailureMode(fM_C2);
95 eM_C2.setEnablingCondition("C_Fault3 && C_Fault4", faultModes);
96 eM_C2.setPDF("dirac (0)");
97
98 c.addErrorMode(eM_C1 , eM_C2);
99
100 // Exports the STPN in XPN format
101 XPNExporter.export(system , "file -name.xpn");
Listing 6.1: Java code snippet for system definition in the running example.
Note that some utility methods have been defined for simplifying the API no-
tation. Specifically, the ErrorMode class exposes two methods: the first (i.e.,
setEnablingCondition()) accepting in input a Boolean expression, written as
a textual parameter in the format of a logic algebra (e.g., A Fault1 &&
A Fault2), as presented in the Backus-Naur Form (BNF) within Listing 6.2,
where E is a valid expression and Fault is a fault name; the second (i.e.,
setPDF()) accepting in input a string indicating the probability distribution
type with its specified parameters (e.g., “exp(5)” represents an exponential
distribution with the parameter λ equal to 5, while “dirac(3)” a determin-
istic distribution in the time instant t equal to 3).
1 E ::= E "&&" E | E "||" E | K"/"N"(" Fault ","*")" | "("E")" | Fault
2
3 Fault ::= "A_Fault1" | "A_Fault2" | "A_Fault3"
4
5 K ::= ? the K positive integer parameter in the voting OR ?
6 N ::= ? the N positive integer parameter in the voting OR ?
Listing 6.2: Backus-Naur Form related to expressions in input to
setEnablingCondition() method. Considering that the valid syntax
depends on fault names of the components (e.g., “A Fault1 ”, “A Fault2 ”,
“A Fault3 ”), the BNF form is here exemplified over the “A” Component,
thus describing the syntax for its ErrorMode instances.
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6.3 The Tool-as-a-Service
While a full implementation of the tool in a as-a-service mode is currently
under development, a stateless REST service implementing the forward en-
gineering processes from design artefacts directly to the output STPN2 is
provided. This service consumes in input a JSON file providing the architec-
tural specification of a system with its failure logic in a custom interpretation
of structural and reliability artefacts3.
The designed JSON format (see Listing 6.3) is conceptually inspired to
SysML BDD diagrams and stochastic FT artefacts, enabling a complete
configuration of their main concepts. The implementation can be easily in-
tegrated with specific data mappers, for accepting in input further equivalent
formats, with the aim of extending the tool compatibility, always in the tool-
chain perspective.
An exemplary fragment of BDD configuration through the JSON bdd at-
tribute is reported in Listing 6.4; while the exemplary fragment about stochas-














Listing 6.3: JSON input file containing both BDD and FT specifications.
2Actually, this service implements both the transformation from design artefacts to a
meta-model instance and the one from the meta-model instance to the output STPN.
3In this way the tool-as-a-service is decoupled from specific data formats of external
graphical tools, thus providing an intermediate representation for Process 1 and Process
2 in the tool-chain perspective workflow of Fig. 6.2.







































Listing 6.4: JSON input file of the BDD in the example.










































42 { "parentId": "b_prop1", "childId": "B_Fault1" },
43 { "parentId": "b_prop1", "childId": "B_Fault2" },
44 { "parentId": "B_Failure1", "childId": "b_prop1" },
45 { "parentId": "a_prop", "childId": "B_Failure1" },
46 { "parentId": "c_prop2", "childId": "B_Failure1" },
47 ...
48 ],
49 "topEvents": ["C_Failure1", "C_Failure2"]
50 }
Listing 6.5: JSON input file of the FT in the example.
Chapter 7
Case Study
In this Chapter a synthetic case study related to a System of Sys-
tems operating in a business-critical context, where failure logic
presents both direct and indirect couplings, is presented. The
modelled scenario highlights the role of the Model-Driven Engi-
neering approach in early design stages of a Cyber-Physical Sys-
tem, thus enabling offline analysis leading the identification of
reliability requirements for the cyber-side of the system.
Specifically, in Sect. 7.1 the operative context of a “Pollution
Monitor System”, operating within the IoT scenario of a Smart
City, impacting on urban traffic and accesses policies for the city,
is addressed.
The system structural design is reported in Sect. 7.2, while its
failure logic design is detailed in Sect. 7.3, introducing two inter-
esting scenarios. In Sect. 7.4 analysis evaluating the impact of
the software quality for the overall system reliability is evaluated
in an early design perspective.
Finally, a brief discussion about expected benefits, deriving from
the adoption of proposed MDE approach with respect to the pre-




The Pollution Monitor System is contextualised within a Smart City IoT
scenario where sensors, actuators, and other physical devices cooperate to
achieve common objectives inside a distributed environment.
In particular, the case study models a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) ex-
ploiting a sensor network able to perceive actual air pollution levels1 so as to
provide decision-making support to Smart City technicians with the aim of
protecting air quality in urban areas through various actions, notably includ-
ing traffic restriction, energy consumption reduction, building temperature
monitoring.
As a common trait of IoT architectures, the system conveniently exploits
a message broker software component in order to enhance system scalability
by decoupling edge devices (responsible of raw data acquisition and pre-
processing) from distributed cloud services (responsible for data refinement,
storage and presentation).
Message brokers, usually implement Enterprise Integration Patterns, such
as the Publish-Subscribe Channel for handling communications among sub-
systems, defining topics of interest, acting as routes from publishers to sub-
scribers software components. Communication routes are dynamically deter-
mined by runtime configurations and, a fortiori, by self-organising strategies
(e.g., a broker may adopt dynamic policies for dispatching queued messages,
also in response external events), thus producing indirect couplings among
software components not directly interconnected through hardware/software
interfaces.
The system is characterised by a data flow rising from physical field de-
vices that periodically send acquired telemetries to a central cloud storage:
the broker intermediates every communication, also realising map-reduce re-
finement processes, such as calculating the moving average on a fixed number
of samples.
Refined data are then analysed by an intelligent software agent, whose
results populate a real-time dashboard, suggesting and supporting critical
decisions for the Smart City Municipality.
1Air pollution indicators include: Sulfur dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen oxides (NO and NO2),
Ozone (O3), Carbon monoxide (CO), Benzene (C6H6 or BTEX), PM10 particulate matter,
PM2.5 particulate matter, Benzo(a)Pyrene (B(a)P), Arsenic (As), Cadmium (Cd) and
Nickel (Ni).
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In such a scenario, the cyber-side of the system plays a relevant role for the
reliability of the entire system; software bugs may produce runtime failures
in monitoring processing, thus leading to the adoption of inadequate policies,
which in turn may produce huge damage for the economy of the Smart City.
7.2 Structural design
The system design is depicted in the SysML Block Definition Diagram of

























Figure 7.1: SysML BDD of the Pollution Monitor System.
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Subsystems of the Pollution Monitor System have been designed so as to
interpret specific roles with specific responsibilities:
• the Smart Agent is responsible for retrieving refined data from the Per-
sistence Subsystem and for interpreting them so as to support decision-
making processes to end-users through a dedicated dashboard;
• the Persistence Subsystem is responsible for storing within the Data
Storage all the refined data, originated by the Ingestion Subsystem;
• the Data Storage is responsible for concretely handling storage and
querying operations, through the adoption of a long-term Database
Management System;
• the Ingestion Subsystem is responsible for managing lower level compo-
nents so as to provide data-level/oriented communications, to acquire
sampled data through subscription on topics within the message broker
platform, as well as to refine and to synthesise data;
• the IoT Broker is responsible for providing data channels, each one
associated to a data topic2, where Field Device Subsystems act as pub-
lishers and Map-Reduce Processors act as subscribers (in the Publish-
Subscribe pattern) about data streams;
• the Map-Reduce Processor is responsible for managing and interme-
diating data-level/oriented communications, acquiring sampled data
through subscription on IoT Broker topics, and refining data (e.g.,
through moving average strategies);
• the Field Device Subsystem is responsible for instantiating a collec-
tion of software components acting as publisher on data topics of the
IoT Broker (i.e., each publisher is responsible for sending raw data
originated by a specific pollutant sensor of the perception layer);
• the Pollutant Sensor is responsible for perceiving environmental raw
data, sampling pollutants. There are several types of sensors, each one
dedicated to the sampling of a different pollutant (e.g., Ozone Sensor,
PM10 Sensor).
2A topic is defined for each sampled parameter (e.g., the pollutant type).
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Notably, under the failure logic perspective, the concept of topic, provided by
the Ingestion Subsystem, behaves as a pseudo-interface connecting software
components through the intermediation of IoT Broker channels, generating
several different data streams. Map and reduce processes, offered by the
Map-Reduce Processor, have to be considered as software components acting
both as subscribers, retrieving data flowing within channels, and publishers,
when they republish synthesised data, for the broker.
Under these assumptions, the case study includes elements of complexity
derived from direct and indirect failure couplings among components, as
detailed in Sect. 3.1.
Indeed, many malfunctions may occur at each level of the SoS, eventu-
ally, deviating system components from their expected behaviour: damaged
or defected IoT sensors, transmission and connectivity issues, wrong broker
configurations (e.g., publishing or subscribing to wrong topics, data over-
flows over the ingestion buffer), defects in map and reduce processes (e.g.,
erroneous implementation of moving averages), excessive delays in delivery
of information, or latent software bugs within the analytic agent business
logic.
These malfunctions may lead to various failure manifestations, such as
data precision errors, data corruption, data losses or unavailable subsystem
which inevitably affect suggestions offered by the software agent inside the
dashboard, in the worst case influencing human technicians decisions.
Two main failure scenarios are considered for the Pollution Monitor System
so as to exemplify the MDE approach in leading early stages for the design of
a CPS, showing how the proposed meta-model becomes an executable rep-
resentation subsuming information from structural and reliability artefacts
so as to automatically derive analysable quantitative models.
To facilitate the identification of the various processes within a FT with
respect to the ontology defined by the meta-model, in this Section, the FTs
have been decorated with:
• dashed areas labelled with the name of a component split FTs in frag-
ments. The failure logic represented by a bounded fragment has to
be intended as a single fault-to-failure propagation characterising the
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associated component, which should be mapped in an ErrorMode in-
stance within the meta-model (also instantiating all necessary faults
and failure modes);
• notes with dashed links, each one interconnected with a failure mode,
indicate failure modes acting as exogenous fault modes for the compo-
nents of higher level in the FT, involved in a failure-to-fault propaga-
tion. Each single note must be mapped in a PropagationPort instance,
coupling ExogenousFaultMode instances with FailureMode instances;
• probability distributions, decorating some edges, report the indication
of the stochastically characterisation of basic events and fault-to-failure
propagations.
The probability density function attributes of ErrorMode and Endoge-
nousFaultMode instances must be created according to these proba-
bility distributions. Rate parameters of probability distributions must
be defined according to their specific syntax (e.g., the rate parameter
lambda of an exponential distribution must be intended as the recip-
rocal of the Mean Time To Failure). The unit of measure adopted for
the experimentation is the day, which means that an exponential with
lambda = 0.1 has a Mean Time To Failure of 10 days.
7.3.1 Scenario 1
In a first scenario, the FT of Fig. 7.2 models the case of no suggestion failure,
which is manifested when Smart Agent is not able to provide any suggestion
supporting decision-making for the final user. This may be due either to
the unavailability of the software agent itself or to the absence of perceived
data at analysis time (i.e., the agent does not retrieve any data from the
Persistence Subsystem or no samples arrived from the Ingestion Subsystem).
In this scenario, according to the data flow, the Smart Agent acts as a higher
level component compared to the Persistence Subsystem, even though both
components belong to the same level in the BDD. This is the representation
of an indirect coupling, occurring between the Persistence Subsystem and the
Smart Agent, due to dependencies subtended by the data retrieving modal-
ities, inasmuch the Smart Agent may clearly use ingested data persisted
within the Data Storage.
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Figure 7.2: Pollution Monitor System FT of No Suggestion Failure.
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In Tab. 7.1 a summary of the failure logic, derivable from the FT of Fig. 7.2,
is reported, highlighting salient features leading the model-driven configura-
tion of the executable meta-model, which cannot be conveniently represented
within an UML Object Diagram because of the structural and failure logic
complexity leading to a wide number of expected object instances.
Subsystem fault-to-failure failure-to-fault
Data Storage · HDD issue none
Persistence Subsystem · Storage Failure
[DBMS issue OR EX1]
EX1 := HDD issue
IoT Broker · Buffer Overflow
· Unavailable Broker
none
Data Storage · Ingestion Failure
[EX2 OR EX3]
EX2 := Buffer Overflow
EX3 := Unavailable Broker
Smart Agent · No Analysis Data Failure
[EX4 OR EX5]
· No Suggestion Failure
[No Analysis Data Fail-
ure OR Unavailable Smart
Agent ]
EX4 := Storage Failure
EX5 := Ingestion Failure
Table 7.1: Summary of the failure logic of the first scenario, derivable from
the FT of Fig. 7.2, reporting for each subsystem its interpretations in terms
of fault-to-failure and failure-to-fault processes of the meta-model. Note that
the EXj notation represents an exogenous fault, while Boolean expressions
of each fault-to-failure process (i.e., an ErrorMode instance) are reported
within square brackets, near the failure mode generated on top of it.
Note that the meta-model does not impose restrictions about the level of de-
tail to adopt; indeed, in the example, a self-referred failure-to-fault propaga-
tion has been explicited for highlighting and for stochastically characterising
the error mode leading to the No Analysis Data Failure.
The Smart Agent contains a first error mode producing the No Analysis
Data Failure, which in turn acts as an exogenous fault for the error mode
characterising the No Suggestion Failure. In so doing, several reasons may
lead to the explication/explicitation of an intermediate failure, exploiting
self-referred failure-to-fault propagations, such in the case of No Analysis
7.4 Quantitative Analysis 87
Data Failure: i) the failure mode is involved also in external processes (act-
ing as an exogenous fault for external components); ii) for reliability pur-
poses, the intermediate failure mode must be evaluated with quantitative
approaches; iii) to better approximate stochastically the whole behaviour of
the component owning the failure mode.
7.3.2 Scenario 2
In a second scenario, the FT of Fig. 7.3 models the case of wrong sugges-
tion failure, which is manifested when Smart Agent provides inappropriate
suggestions to final users, thus possibly inducing in wrong decisions of the
Municipality. This may be caused either by a software bug or by analysis
applied over corrupted data. This second FT captures the whole complexity
about configurations of the Ingestion Subsystem and about data synthesis
processes. In the specific case, the Map-Reduce Processor computes a moving
average over static temporal windows.
The sub-tree of PM10 Data Synthesis Failure models significant disalig-
naments for a specific pollutant between the calculated moving average and
the real world values: this failure is manifested only if a wide number of
data acquired from sensors are defective for a continuous time period. In
this scenario, a filtering strategy able to remove at most K ′′ outliers (over
N ′′ values) at a time has been considered. A defective data can be caused
by a defective sensor or by a wrong topic configuration of related publisher
client processes (within the Field Device Subsystem), thus producing a sen-
sible delay in the failure propagation mechanism. At the same time, it can
be supposed that the Smart Agent is able to tolerate at most the failure of
K ′ pollutants data refinement processes over N ′ monitored pollutants.
In Tab. 7.2 a summary of the failure logic, derivable from the FT of
Fig. 7.3, is reported. Also in this case it is unfeasible to represent a complete
UML Object Diagram about propagation processes.
7.4 Quantitative Analysis
The experimental case study emphasises the importance of evaluating system






























































































Figure 7.3: Pollution Monitor System FT of Wrong Suggestion Failure.
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Subsystem fault-to-failure failure-to-fault













EX1(p, i) := Defective
Pollutant Sensor Issue(p,i)






[K′′ out of N ′′EX3(p,i)]
· Pollutant Data
Refinement Failure(p)
[Pollutant Data Synthesis Fail-
ure(p) OR Subscriber Pollutant
Topic Issue(p) OR Pollutant SW
Map/Reduce Bug Issue(p)]
EX3(p, i) := Pollutant
Data Sensor Failure (p,i)
Smart Agent · Analysis Corrupted
Data Failure
[K′ out of N ′EX4(p)]
· Wrong Suggestion Failure
[Analysis Corrupted Data Failure
OR SW Bug]
EX4(p) := Pollutant Data
Refinement Failure(p)
Table 7.2: Summary of the failure logic of the second scenario, derivable
from the FT of Fig. 7.3, reporting for each subsystem its interpretations
in terms of fault-to-failure and failure-to-fault processes of the meta-model.
Note that the EXj notation represents an exogenous fault, while Boolean
expressions of each fault-to-failure process (i.e., an ErrorMode instance) are
reported within square brackets, near the failure mode generated on top of
it. Besides, in this scenario, the failure logic strictly depends on redundancy
levels of installed sensors and of monitored pollutant types. To synthesise
the table, some failures and processes have been parameterized with p and i,
respectively representing the iteration over the monitored pollutant and the
i− th sensor within the i− th field device.
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monitoring dashboard may lead to improper solutions and decisions by Smart
City executives (e.g., a severe traffic block, while still bringing environmental
benefits, may also have huge impact societal and economical).
In this Section, advantages of adopting the presented MDE approach
(see Sect. 3.2) in supporting early design of Cyber-Physical Systems are
exemplified, by evaluating the reliability of the cyber-side with respect to
the physical-side, comparing the preliminary failure model (depicted in the
FTs of each scenario in Fig. 7.2 and Fig. 7.3), where hardware and software
components may fail, with an ideal model where software components never
fail.
In the case of unsatisfied reliability requirements, further compared anal-
ysis among different system configurations may be performed, integrating
software fault-tolerance techniques (e.g., redundancy policies, voting algo-
rithms, or caching strategies) in order to determine a target system design
guaranteeing to satisfy both requirements specification and business criteria.
In so doing, the approach conciliates the contrasting needs of increasing
the reliability of software components up to an acceptable level while main-
taining acceptable design and development costs.
7.4.1 Scenario 1
Specifically, the Boolean logic modelled in Fig. 7.2 represents the limit case of
a FT equivalent to a great disjunction on all the possible endogenous faults,
everyone acting as single point-of-failures. Whereas, moreover, all the fault-
to-failure logic propagate very quickly (either through IMM transitions or
through EXP with high rate, i.e., λ = 4), the top event occurrence (i.e., No
Suggestion Failure) can be stochastically approximated by an exponential
distribution with λ equal to the summation of each endogenous fault rate
(i.e., λ = 3.25 ∗ 10−2). As a consequence, in absence of redundancy policies,
the resulting system availability is very short with a probability of 0.63 to
be failed at the first month. This is due to the fact that, while hardware
components behave reliably, system failures are mainly determined by the
cyber-side. Specifically, just by introducing a dual modular redundancy
operating mode for the Smart Agent which is the main responsible for the
overall system failure (due to an MTTF of 60 days), the probability of being
failed at the first month can be decreased to 0.38.
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7.4.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario of Wrong Suggestion Failure, depicted in Fig. 7.3, presents
a business-critical failure, which may have a higher impact on the Smart City
economy, as reflected by the internal propagation logic further exacerbated
by the presence of some voting OR gates. Markovian analysis results, re-
ported in Fig. 7.4, stress the role as runtime raw data manager played by
the cyber side (in particular by IoT publisher and subscriber clients, and by
map-reduce processes) and the way it affects once again the overall system
reliability, making ineffective and superfluous the adoption of a broad set of
professional perceiving hardware sensors and driving the system to a prob-
ability of failure of 0.84 at 100 days of operation (as outlined by the light


























Figure 7.4: Transient probabilities of the Wrong Suggestion Failure top
event, computed under 3 different configurations of the Pollution Monitor
System (i.e., preliminary, ideal, and target failure models).
To face this reliability issue, risk analysts can leverage the MDE ap-
proach, within the tool-chain perspective, to derive an ideal lower bound for
the system failure probability (i.e., the black curve of Fig. 7.4), obtained by
neglecting the impact of software components in the propagation logic.
On the one hand, this ideal software design supports the identification
of minimum reliability requirements for software components, driving the
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adoption of tailored software fault-tolerance techniques (e.g., Multi-Version
Software [62], software rejuvenation policies [105]) and demanding for quality
improvements on the overall development process (e.g., through the concrete
implementation of eXtreme Programming methodologies [8] or Test-Driven
Development practices [9]). As a practical example, the grey curve of Fig. 7.4
represents a feasible target failure model for the software development stage
and has been obtained reducing by one-third the rate related to endogenous
software faults, thus decreasing the system failure probability to 0.26 (at
t = 100 days).
On the other hand, this enables to pay further attention to the real
impact of hardware components, possibly acting coarse- and fine- tuning
configurations to achieve a trade-off between economical costs and benefits
in terms of reliability.
7.5 Discussion
The presented case study emphasises the role of the MDE approach in driving
early design stages of a CPS, exploiting results produced by offline reliabil-
ity analysis, thus weighing the development costs for the cyber-side (whose
reliability is a key factor).
In the same way, the MDE approach may also be useful: in runtime mon-
itoring processes3, for analysing the system behaviour during operation; in
determining advanced strategies for just-in-time maintenance techniques or
software rejuvenation policies by fault-forecasting. Indeed, assuring a con-
stant alignment between meta-model instances and their respective physical
counterparts may realise the digital twins paradigm, where runtime and mon-
itored data over physical components may enable refinements over probabil-
ity density functions distributions, associated to endogenous fault and error
mode instances, as well as over routing probabilities
In so doing, runtime transformations in STPN format enable runtime
reliability evaluations and comparisons over different SoS configurations, ex-
ploiting alternatives derived from Product Line Engineering design to realise
adaptive systems, which require to change their configurations in response
3Note that execution times, observed in the experimentation of the case study on a
consumer-level notebook (equipped with 16GB of DDR4 RAM and Intel Core i7-9750H
CPU) oscillate from 10ms to 70ms for the consecutive transformations from the JSON
input to the XPN export. These executions times can surely be considered acceptable for
the application in runtime analysis, not subject to real-time constraints.
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to dynamic fault occurrences, as in the case of Interwoven Systems for which





This Chapter summarises the contribution of the thesis and discusses avenues
for future research.
8.1 Summary of contributions
This dissertation contributes to the area of Model-Driven Engineering (MDE),
proposing a model-driven approach supporting timed failure logic analysis
of complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in business-critical scenarios.
Specifically, the research defines a meta-model joining structural informa-
tion about system architectures with their failure logic, decoupling represen-
tations of communication interfaces from those of failure propagation, also
coping with data-level failures. Erroneous data, generated by the perception
layer of an Internet of Things (IoT) architecture, may produce faults which
do not affect intermediate software components (e.g., in Message-Oriented
Middlewares acting as brokers) orchestrating the communication flow, alter-
ing instead the behaviour of smart systems exploiting data for supporting
remote decision-making processes not directly interconnected to physical sen-
sors.
The meta-model enables a round-trip engineering through the definition
of a set of transformation rules, supporting the automated and correct-
by-construction initialisation of meta-model instances starting from SysML
Block Definition Diagrams (BDD) for the system specification and stochastic
Fault Trees (FT) for its timed failure logic, thus activating co-evolution mech-
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anisms, which propagate external manual modifications applied on meta-
model instances directly to adopted structural and reliability artefacts.
At the same time, a set of transformation rules has been defined so as
to enable the automated generation of Stochastic Time Petri Nets (STPN)
from meta-model instances, thus supporting quantitative evaluation of timed
failure logic.
In so doing, the MDE approach, leveraging on the proposed meta-model,
bridges the gap between the perspectives of System Engineering, Software
Engineering and Reliability Engineering: indeed, a software implementation
of the meta-model, allowing runtime modifications over its executable repre-
sentation, directly combines reliability analysis models with design artefacts
through automated transformations in a single and coherent vision.
The meta-model has been designed also for supporting the modelling of
product families in a product line perspective, favouring reuse of meta-model
instances while maintaining up-to-date runtime configurations in response to
frequent changes.
A prototypical implementation of the proposed MDE approach has been in-
troduced through a plain Java API as well as in a tool-as-a-service mode, ex-
posing functionalities for automatically instantiating meta-model instances,
starting from input artefacts, and for exporting STPN models in the format
of Oris Tool.
The MDE approach has been experimented on a realistic case study
related to a CPS operating within a Smart City, demonstrating its usefulness
in the stochastic evaluation of reliability features with respect to system and
failure logic requirements and design artefacts.
8.2 Directions for future work
The research activities will address the enhancement of the proposed meta-
model for representing:
• transient faults, a class of faults that are not persistent within a system,
but rather are characterised by a temporary nature (e.g., a transient
fault may disappear from the system by itself, after a certain period);
• recovery mechanisms, capable of activating a repairing process for a
faulty component (e.g., software approaches may exploit fault detection
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techniques with alternative implementations);
• software rejuvenation, a fault-tolerant approach for restoring initial
levels of reliability, thus fighting software ageing processes.
On the one hand, the interpretation of transient faults and recovery mech-
anisms concepts is someway different and a final design for the meta-model
abstraction must be yet defined.
Considering that the application of recovery mechanisms produces tran-
sient faults, both these concepts may be modelled within a STPN by in-
troducing a general transition, which moves the token from an Endogenous
Fault Occurrence place to an Endogenous Fault Process place, restarting the
timed transition.
However, at the time when the fault is restored, a transient fault may
have contributed in a failure manifestation; thus, further investigations about
how to deal with the propagation of these failures should be addressed, an-
swering to the question “should exogenous faults, activated by failure-to-fault
processes, be considered transient or persistent?”.
On the other hand, the rejuvenation process can be modelled in a STPN
as a transition which removes and replaces the token from the starting place
of an endogenous fault process, thus restarting the outgoing transition and
enabling evaluations about scheduled restarts for software components.
Besides, the research will consider the adoption of alternative input arte-
facts (e.g., AADL, Reliability Block Diagrams, Component FTs) for the
round-trip engineering process and output artefacts (e.g., queuing networks)
for the generation of quantitative analysis models.
In the tool perspective, the Java API, also at the core of the tool-as-a-
service mode, will be integrated with software modules able to implement
the transformation rules from meta-model instances to design and reliability
artefacts, thus realising the reverse process of the round-trip engineering.
Moreover, the tool will be improved with the implementation of built-in
analysis and simulations (e.g., root-cause analysis, fault injection practices
for rare events studies) and of a User Interface for graphically modelling
the system specification and its failure logic, as well as, for easing the input





This appendix is related to the transformation algorithms at the core of the
round-trip engineering process (see Sect. 4.3) between the meta-model and
adopted structural and reliability artefacts, as well as to the transformation
algorithm for generating an STPN model from a meta-model instance.
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A.1 SysML Block Definition Diagram
to Meta-model instance
transformation algorithm
In this Section, a pseudo-algorithm related to the transformation rules, de-
scribed in Sect. 4.3, leading the automated instantiation of an architectural
fragment of the meta-model configuration starting from a SysML Block Def-
inition Diagram (BDD) artefact is presented.
Essentially, the algorithm is based on a in-depth visit of the SysML BDD
artefact, starting from the top-level item, recursively exploring each child
item.
Algorithm 1: SysML BDD to Meta-model architectural specifica-
tion transformation
input : bdd (SysML BDD artefact)
output: MMSA (Meta-Model System Architecture instance)
// Global variable initialisation
1 MMSA ← ∅
// Extracts the System block within BDD
2 systemItem ← extractTopLevelSystem(bdd)
3 system ← new System(extractItemName(systemItem))
4 topLevelComponent ← new Component(extractItemName(systemItem))
5 recursiveBDDvisit(systemItem, topLevelComponent, system)
6 add system to MMSA
7 return MMSA
Algorithm 2: recursiveBDDvisit
input : item (the current BDD block)
input : parentComponent (the parent Component)
input : system (the overall System)
1 component ← new Component(extractItemName(item))
2 add component to system components
3 if parentComponent is not null then
4 compositionPort ← new CompositionPort(parentComponent, component)
5 add compositionPort to parentComponent
6 end
7 childrenItems ← children of item
8 foreach childItem ∈ childrenItems do
9 recursiveBDDvisit(childItem, component, system)
10 end
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A.2 Meta-model instance
to SysML Block Definition Diagrams
transformation algorithm
In this Section, a pseudo-algorithm related to the transformation rules, de-
scribed in Sect. 4.3, enabling the automated export of a SysML Block Defi-
nition Diagram (BDD) artefact from a runtime instance of the architectural
fragment of the meta-model is presented.
Essentially, the algorithm is based on a in-depth visit of the meta-model
instance, starting from the System instance, exploring recursively each child
Component, identified through its CompositionPort instances.
Algorithm 3: Meta-model architectural specification to SysML
BDD transformation
input : mmsa (Meta-Model System Architecture instance)
output: BDD (SysML BDD artefact)
// Global variable initialisation
1 BDD ← ∅
2 system ← extractSystem(mmsa)
3 systemItem ← new Item(name of system)
4 add systemItem to BDD
5 topLevelComponentInstance ← topLevelComponent of system
6 topLevelComponentItem ← new Item(name of topLevelComponentInstance)




input : component (the current Component)
input : parentItem (the parent BDD block)
1 compositionPorts ← compositionPorts of component
2 foreach compositionPort ∈ compositionPorts do
3 childComponent ← childComponentInstance of compositionPort
4 componentItem ← new Item(name of childComponent)




A.3 Stochastic Fault Tree
to Meta-model instance
transformation algorithm
In this Section, a pseudo-algorithm related to the transformation rules, de-
scribed in Sect. 4.3, leading the automated instantiation of a meta-model
configuration starting from a stochastic Fault Tree artefact is presented.
Note that the algorithm is based on the recursive procedure elaborateBound-
edFT, invoked over each top event, which firstly identifies the boundaries
of a sub-tree corresponding to an error mode, and then for each lower level
failure mode (i.e., a failure mode acting as a basic event in the bounded FT)
invokes the recursion.
In turn, the elaborateBoundedFT exploits a recursive subprocedure recur-
siveElaboration, which effectively identifies endogenous and exogenous faults
of the bounded sub-tree, at the same time building the enabling condition
over the composition of logical gates.
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Algorithm 5: Stochastic FT to Meta-model failure logic transfor-
mation
input : sft (Stochastic Fault Tree artefact)
input : mmsa (Meta-Model System Architecture instance)
output: MMC (Meta-Model Configuration instance)
// Global variable initialisation
1 MMC ← mmsa
// It identifies Stochastic FT top-events
2 topEvents ← extractTopEvents(sft)
3 foreach topEvent ∈ topEvents do
4 fmLabel ← extractFailureModeLabel(topEvent)
5 sourceC ← extractSourceComponent(topEvent)
6 failureMode ← new FailureMode(fmLabel, sourceC)







1 INTERMEDIATE FAILURE MODES QUEUE ← ∅
2 EXOGENOUS FAULTS ← ∅
3 ENDOGENOUS FAULTS ← ∅
4 topEventGate ← child of bftTopEvent
5 enablingCondition ← recursiveElaboration(topEventGate)
6 timeToFailurePDF ← extractTimeToFailurePDF(topEventGate)
7 errorMode ← new ErrorMode(EXOGENOUS FAULTS, ENDOGENOUS FAULTS,
failureMode, enablingCondition, timeToFailurePDF)
8 add errorMode to MMC
9 while INTERMEDIATE FAILURE MODES QUEUE is not empty do
10 intermediateFailureMode ← pull an item from







1 if event is a Gate then
2 booleanExpression ← gateElaboration(event)
3 return booleanExpression
4 end
5 else if event is a BasicEvent then
6 endFmLabel ← extractExogenousFaultModeLabel(event)
7 endoFm ← findEndogenousFaultMode(endFmLabel)
8 if endoFm is NULL then
9 endoFmPDF ← extractEndogenousFaultModePDF(event)
10 endoFm ← new EndogenousFaultMode(endFmLabel, endoFmPDF)




15 else if event is a FailureMode then
16 fmLabel ← extractFailureModeLabel(event)
17 failureMode ← findFailureMode(fmLabel)
18 if failureMode is NULL then
19 add event to INTERMEDIATE FAILURE MODES QUEUE
20 sourceC ← extractOwnerComponent(event)
21 failureMode ← new FailureMode(fmLabel, sourceC)
22 add failureMode to MMC
23 end
24 exoFmLabel ← extractExogenousFaultModeLabel(event)
25 exoFm ← new ExogenousFaultMode(exoFmLabel)
26 add exoFm to EXOGENOUS FAULTS add exoFm to MMC
27 routingProb ← extractRoutingProbability(event)
28 c ← extractAffectedComponent(event)
29 propagationPort ← new PropagationPort(c,failureMode,exoFm,routingProb)
30 add propagationPort to MMC
31 return exoFmLabel
32 end





1 booleanExpression ← NULL
2 boolExprs ← ∅
3 children ← children of event
4 foreach child ∈ children do
5 boolExpr ← recursiveElaboration(child)
6 add boolExpr to boolExprs
7 end
8 if event is a OrGate then
9 booleanExpression ← “(”+boolExprs [0]+“ ‖ ”+boolExprs [1]+“)”
10 end
11 if event is a AndGate then
12 booleanExpression ← “(”+boolExprs [0]+“ && ”+boolExprs [1]+“)”
13 end
14 if event is a VotingOr then
15 booleanExpression ← “ K/N( ”
16 while i ← 0; i < N ; i++ do
17 append boolExprs [i] to booleanExpression
18 if i 6= N then
19 append “,” to booleanExpression
20 end
21 end





to stochastic Fault Tree
transformation algorithm
In this Section, a pseudo-algorithm related to the transformation rules, de-
scribed in Sect. 4.3, enabling the automated export of a Stochastic Fault
Trees artefact from a runtime instance of the failure logic fragment of the
meta-model is presented.
Essentially, the algorithm is based on a in-depth visit of the meta-model
instance, starting from FailureMode istances acting as top-events, exploring
associated ErrorMode and FaultMode instances, then recurring on lower-
level FailureMode instances acting as ExogenousFaultMode instances.
Algorithm 9: Meta-model to stochastic FT transformation
input : mm (Meta-Model instance)
output: SFT (Stochastic Fault Tree artefact)
// Global variable initialisation
1 SFT ← ∅
2 system ← extractSystem(mm)
// a top-event failure mode in the meta-model instance is
// a FailureMode instance not acting as propagatedFailure
// in any PropagationPort instance
3 teFMs ← extractTopEvents(system)
4 foreach teFM ∈ teFMs do
5 topEvent ← name of teFM
6 add topEvent to SFT
7 childEvent ← recursiveFailureModeElaboration(teFM)
8 add childEvent to children of topEvent
9 end
10 return SFT
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Algorithm 10: recursiveFailureModeElaboration
input : failureMode (FailureMode instance)
output: gateEvent (event gate producing the event associated to the
FailureMode instance)
// the ErrorMode instance producing the FailureMode instance is
retrieved
1 errorMode ← extractErrorMode(failureMode)
2 enablingCondition ← extractEnablingCondition(errorMode)
3 timeToFailurePDF ← extractTimeToFailurePDF(errorMode)
4 endoFMs ← extractEndogenousFaultModes(errorMode)
5 exoFMs ← extractExogenousFaultModes(errorMode)
6 basicEvents ← ∅
7 foreach endoFM ∈ endoFMs do
8 basicEvent ← new FaultModeEvent(name of endoFM)
9 add basicEvent to basicEvents
10 end
11 fmEvents ← ∅
12 foreach exoFM ∈ exoFMs do
13 propagationPort ← extractSourcePropagationPort(exoFM)
14 sourceFailureMode ← extractSourceFailureMode(propagationPort)
15 fmEvent ← findEvent(name of sourceFailureMode)
16 if fmEvent is NULL then
17 fmEvent ← new FailureModeEvent(name of sourceFailureMode)
18 childEvent ← recursiveFailureModeElaboration(sourceFailureMode)
19 add childEvent to children of fmEvent
20 end
21 add routingProbability for exoFM to fmEvent
22 add fmEvent to fmEvents
23 end
24 gateEvent ← transformEnablingCondition(enablingCondition, basicEvents,
fmEvents)




input : enablingCondition (full or partial BooleanExpression instance)
input : basicEvents (Fault Tree Basic Events)
input : fmEvents (Failure Mode Intermediate Events)
output: event (the event associated to the enabling condition)
1 booleanOperator ← extractLogicalOperator(enablingCondition)
2 if booleanOperator is not NULL then
3 event ← ∅
4 if booleanOperator is OrGate then
5 event ← new OrGateEvent()
6 end
7 else if booleanOperator is AndGate then
8 event ← new AndGateEvent()
9 end
10 else if booleanOperator is VotingOrGate then
11 K ← extractK(VotingOrGate)
12 N ← extractN(VotingOrGate)
13 event ← new VotingOrGateEvent(K, N)
14 end
15 splittedExpressions ← splitBooleanExpression(enablingCondition,
booleanOperator)
16 foreach splittedExpression ∈ splittedExpressions do
17 childEvent ← transformEnablingCondition(enablingCondition,
basicEvents, fmEvents)




22 event ← findByName(basicEvents, enablingCondition)
23 if event is NULL then
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A.5 Meta-model instance
to Stochastic Time Petri Net
transformation algorithm
In this Section, a pseudo-algorithm related to the transformation rules, as
described in Sect. 5.3, leading the automated extraction of a Stochastic Time
Petri Net from a meta-model instance is presented.
Note that the algorithm is splitted in three subprocedures, respectively map-
ping EndogenousFaultMode instances, ErrorMode instances, and Propaga-
tionPort instances into corresponding STPN submodels.
Algorithm 12: Meta-model to stochastic Time Petri Net transfor-
mation
input : mm (Meta-Model instance)
output: STPN (Stochastic Time Petri Net instance)
// Global variable initialisation
1 STPN ← ∅
2 endogenousFaultModes ← extractAllEndogenousFaultModes(mm)
3 foreach endogenousFaultMode ∈ endogenousFaultModes do
4 buildEndogenousProcessesSubModel(endogenousFaultMode)
5 end
6 errorModes ← extractAllErrorModes(mm)
7 foreach errorMode ∈ errorModes do
8 buildFaultToFailureSubModel(errorMode)
9 end
10 propagationPorts ← extractAllPropagationPorts(mm)






input : endogenousFaultMode (EndogenousFaultMode instance)
1 label ← extractName(endogenousFaultMode)
2 startPlaceName ← label + “ Process”
3 startPlace ← new Place(startPlaceName, 1)
4 endPlaceName ← label + “ Occurrence”
5 endPlace ← new Place(endPlaceName, 0)
6 pdf ← extractPDF(endogenousFaultMode)
7 transition ← new Transition(startPlace, endPlace, pdf)
8 add startPlace to STPN
9 add endPlace to STPN
10 add transition to STPN
Algorithm 14: buildFaultToFailureSubModel
input : errorMode (ErrorMode instance)
1 label ← extractName(errorMode)
2 startPlaceName ← label + “ Fault-to-Failure Process”
3 startPlace ← new Place(startPlaceName, 1)
4 failureMode ← extractFailureMode(errorMode)
5 failureModeName ← extractName(failureMode)
6 endPlaceName ← failureModeName + “ Occurrence”
7 endPlace ← new Place(endPlaceName, 0)
8 ttfPDF ← extractTTF(errorMode)
9 enablingCondition ← extractEnablingCondition(errorMode)
10 transition ← new Transition(startPlace, endPlace, ttfPDF, enablingCondition)
11 add startPlace to STPN
12 add endPlace to STPN
13 add transition to STPN
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Algorithm 15: buildFailureToFaultSubModel
input : propagationPort (PropagationPort instance)
1 failureMode ← extractPropagatedFailureMode(propagationPort)
2 failureModeName ← extractName(failureMode)
3 label ← failureModeName + “ Occurrence”
4 startPlace ← searchPlaceByName(STPN, label)
5 startTransition ← findOutgoingTransition(STPN, startPlace)
6 if startTransition is null then
7 startTransition ← new Transition(startPlace, null, “ immediate”)
8 add notPropagatingTransition to STPN
9 end
10 exogenousFaultMode ← extractExogenousFaultMode(propagationPort)
11 exoFmName ← extractName(exogenousFaultMode)
12 hookTransition ← null
13 routingProbability ← extractRoutingProbability(propagationPort)
14 if routingProbability is 1 then
15 hookTransition ← startTransition
16 end
17 else
18 routingPlaceName ← exoFmName + “ Router”
19 routingPlace ← new Place(routingPlaceName, 0)
20 propagatingTransition ← new Transition(routingPlace, null, “ immediate”,
routingProbability)
21 notPropagatingTransition ← new Transition(routingPlace, null,
“ immediate”, (1− routingProbability))
22 add routingPlace to STPN
23 add propagatingTransition to STPN
24 add notPropagatingTransition to STPN
25 hookTransition ← propagatingTransition
26 end
27 endPlaceName ← exoFmName + “ Occurrence”
28 endPlace ← new Place(endPlaceName, 0)
29 finalTransition ← new Transition(hookPlace, endPlace, “ immediate”)
30 add endPlace to STPN
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